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ABSTRACT 
Norm internalization, an objective for trials for violations of 
international law, seeks to use the trial to demonstrate to a target 
audience, usually the community of the defendant, the costs of 
violating international law and the stigma of being a violator.  The 
purpose of this exercise is to internalize in that audience a respect 
for international law and for the norm in question that drives the 
audience not to repeat the violation in the future.  Some scholars 
have argued that this purpose should be the primary purpose 
behind international criminal trials.  Others have argued that it 
should, at minimum, be the primary objective of trials for those 
detained at Guantanamo Bay, with the goal of internalizing an 
anti-terrorism norm in the Islamic world.  Despite the prominence 
of norm internalization in the literature of international criminal 
law, however, trials for violations of international law have 
generally failed to internalize norms in the community of the 
defendant. 
This Article examines these past failures and inductively 
derives four necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, conditions for 
the success of norm internalization in the community of the 
defendant: consistency, selectivity, accessibility, and integration.  
Meeting these conditions avoids pitfalls that have prevented 
successful norm internalization in past trials.  Application of these 
conditions to past and future trials at Guantanamo Bay reveals 
such trials are ill-suited to internalization of an anti-terrorism norm 
in the Islamic world.  Military commissions, which did not include 
norm internalization as a prominent objective, failed to meet the 
four required conditions.  More importantly, future trials of this 
detainee population, regardless of venue, appear incapable of 
meeting them.  Given these failures, this Article suggests that trials 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
 
428 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:2 
of Guantanamo detainees would more profitably focus on 
alternative, more attainable trial objectives.  These failures also 
raise real questions about whether trials for violations of 
international law can contribute to norm internalization in the 
community of the defendant. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In May 2009 President Obama delivered a clarion call for a new 
approach to those detained at Guantanamo that he believes will 
better protect the United States and its allies from al Qaeda and 
affiliated groups and at the same time protect American values.1  
 
 * Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of 
Law.  Attorney-Adviser at the U.S. Department of State from 2003–2008, with 
responsibility for Guantanamo issues from 2006–2008.  The opinions and 
characterizations in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent the official positions of the United States.  Special thanks to Josh Gajer 
and Matthew Saks for their work as research assistants on this piece.  Also thanks 
to Ashley S. Deeks, John C. Dehn, Christopher P. DeNicola, Ryan Goodman, 
Andrew Grotto, Monica Hakimi, Maggie Lemos, Adam Smith, Matthew Waxman, 
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Unlike the Bush Administration, it appears that the Obama White 
House is embracing a counterterrorism strategy that will more 
centrally feature trials.  After criticizing the Bush-era military 
commissions for completing only three cases in nearly seven years 
of existence, the President called for trials to proceed against 
Guantanamo detainees in two venues.  First, President Obama 
indicated his support for conducting trials in the U.S. federal courts 
for terrorists who have violated “American criminal laws.”  
Second, he declared that modified military commissions should be 
convened against those “who violate the laws of war.” The 
President acted on this planned approach in the fall.  In October he 
signed into law the Military Commissions Act of 2009 , revamping 
military commissions with greater procedural protections for the 
defendants.2  He then announced his intention to move the 
prosecutions of those involved in the 9/11 attacks to the U.S. 
federal courts, while leaving in military commissions other cases, 
including that of a detainee suspected of involvement in the 2000 
attack on the USS Cole.3 
In these announcements, the Obama Administration, like the 
Bush Administration before it, left vague the exact reasons why the 
United States is interested in conducting trials of those detained at 
Guantanamo.  Attorney General Eric Holder testified to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee that at least one reason for the shift in 
prosecution strategy was, “the nation and the world will see 
[Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, alleged 9/11 planner] for the coward 
that he is.”4  Holder’s testimony dovetails with the writing of some 
international legal scholars, who have argued that at least those 
trials convened for violations of international law should be 
oriented around developing and deepening an anti-terrorism norm 
in those communities where tacit support of or silent indifference 
 
and the Junior Faculty Group at Cardozo without whose thoughtful engagement 
this piece would not be possible. 
1 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21, 
2009) (transcript available in the National Archives) [hereinafter Obama Address]. 
2 Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 
(codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) [hereinafter “MCA09”]. 
3 See Charlie Savage, Accused 9/11 Mastermind to Face Civilian Trial in N.Y., 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1 (describing planned Obama approach). 
4 Charlie Savage, Holder Defends Decision to Use U.S. Court for 9/11 Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at A18. 
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towards terrorism has allowed it to flourish.5  This Article calls this 
trial objective the “norm internalization” theory of trials and 
punishment.6  Under this theory, trials of terrorists for violations of 
international law can strengthen the acceptance of the international 
legal prohibition on terrorism in communities where that norm is 
not well rooted.  Trials do so by inculcating within society a sense 
that these violations are morally unacceptable.  More specifically, 
trials internalize norms by bolstering respect for international law 
through fair trials;7 by dramatizing the effect of the lawbreaking 
conduct through the spectacle of trial, in the process developing an 
accurate historical narrative;8 and by stigmatizing those who 
commit these violations through punishment indicative of 
international disapproval of the conduct in question.9  The ultimate 
goal of norm internalization in this context is an internalized social 
 
5 See Mark A. Drumbl, The Expressive Value of Prosecuting and Punishing 
Terrorists: Hamdan, The Geneva Conventions and International Criminal Law, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1187 (2007) (arguing that this is the “most plausible 
justification” for punishing al Qaeda terrorists); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Tougher 
than Terror: To Fight Criminal Terrorism, We Need to Strengthen Our Domestic and 
Global System of Criminal Justice, Not Militarize It, 13 AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 28, 2002, at 
22, 24–25 (contending that trials can cement public condemnation of attacks 
against civilians by any actor, state or non-state, for any cause). 
6 Different authors use different names for this theory.  Mark Drumbl uses 
the term “expressive” theory of punishment to describe the view that the purpose 
of punishment is to strengthen faith in the rule of law and to develop and 
disseminate a historical narrative for distribution to the public.  MARK A. DRUMBL, 
ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (2007).  Mirjan Damaška 
writes about the “didactic objective” for trials, which he defines as the “socio-
pedagogical” role of strengthening accountability for violations of international 
law through exposure and stigmatization of wrongdoing.  Mirjan Damaška, What 
is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329, 345 (2008).  
See also LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND 
HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 3 (2001) (using the term “pedagogic” for 
this trial function).  I have chosen the term “norm internalization” to describe this 
theory of the purpose of trial and punishment because it most clearly explains 
why observers hope that trials contain expressive content that educates a target 
audience: internalization of norms and respect for law that will ensure future 
compliance with the law. 
7 Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, 
Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1407, 1462 (2002). 
8 See David Luban, Beyond Moral Minimalism, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 353, 355 
(2006) (explaining that the “dramaturgy of the trial process” is a tool for norm 
projection in international criminal law). 
9 See DRUMBL, supra note 6, at 174 (citing DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND 
MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY ON SOCIAL THEORY 252 (1990) and EMILE DURKHEIM, THE 
DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1933) (additional citations omitted)). 
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commitment to the prohibition of terrorism within the Islamic 
world,10 which would provide the most stable route to prevention 
of future terrorist activity.11 
Applying norm internalization theory to terrorism trials fits 
comfortably within an emerging strand of scholarship, which 
argues that norm internalization is the most important purpose for 
international criminal law writ large.12  Norm internalization 
appears to be an attractive trial objective when three conditions are 
met.  First, there is a clear international criminal prohibition on the 
conduct in question and the cost of continued violations of the 
norm is high.  This creates a great desire to prevent future 
violations.  Second, the prohibition in question is not deeply rooted 
 
10 For purposes of this Article, the Islamic world refers to majority Muslim 
States, as well as to significant communities of Muslims in non-Muslim States.  
But see Lee Smith, Obama the Underminer: By Addressing the “Muslim World” from 
Cairo, the President is Helping Tehran, SLATE, June 3, 2009, http://www.slate.com 
/id/2219706 (arguing that there has been no “Muslim world” since the demise of 
the Ottoman Empire after World War I). 
11 Of course, terrorism is not a phenomenon unique to the Islamic world.  The 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam used suicide bombings and other terror 
techniques to fight for a homeland in Sri Lanka.  See Preeti Bhattacharji, Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (aka Tamil Tigers) (Sri Lanka, Separatists), COUN. ON FOREIGN 
REL., May 20, 2009, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9242 (describing 
numerous suicide attacks committed by the group: including assassination of 
former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe 
Premadasa).  The Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.) and the Basque Fatherland and 
Liberty (E.T.A.) have used terrorism for similar reasons in Europe.  See Kathryn 
Gregory, Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) (aka, PIRA, “the provos,” Óglaigh na 
hÉireann) (U.K., separatists), COUN. ON FOREIGN REL., July 16, 2008, available at 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9240 (describing attacks by the I.R.A. that have 
killed at least 650 civilians since the late 60s); Preeti Bhattacharji, Basque Fatherland 
and Liberty (ETA) (Spain, separatists, Euskadi ta Askatasuna), COUN. ON FOREIGN REL., 
Nov. 17, 2008, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9271 (quoting Spanish 
government as attributing 1600 terrorist attacks to the group).  The Chinese 
Government has prosecuted Buddhist monks for what it alleges were bombings of 
civilian property in Tibet.  Keith Bradsher, 16 Monks Arrested in Tibet Bombing, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2008, at A7.  This Article is focused on Islamic terrorism 
because the severity of the problems currently posed by al Qaeda and the Taliban 
creates an immediate need for internalization of an anti-terrorism norm in the 
Islamic world. 
12 Mirjan Damaška argues that “socio-pedagogical” considerations should 
drive international criminal justice, as he believes exposing violations of 
international law through trials and stigmatizing violations through punishment 
will deepen commitment to international law.  Damaška, supra note 6.  Gary Bass 
has written that development of an accurate historical narrative, key to norm 
internalization success, is the only consistently legitimate purpose for conducting 
trials for violations of international law.  GARY J. BASS, STAY THE HAND OF 
VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 287 (2000). 
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in the personal or social morality of the community, creating a risk 
that this community will violate the norm.  Generally, this 
community is that of the defendant.  Often the defendant is just 
one of many members of his community who has violated 
international law, creating a need to deepen that community’s 
commitment to international law.13  Third, there exists a population 
of potential defendants whose trials might produce narratives 
sufficient to deepen social commitment to the norm in question. 
Such efforts seek to achieve a new “Nuremberg moment,” the 
colloquial term used to refer to the wrenching social changes in 
Germany that followed World War II and the International 
Military Tribunal (“IMT”) war crimes trials.  As a historical matter 
there is good reason to believe that the IMT’s contribution to the 
change in German attitudes was limited at best.14  An aggressive 
Allied de-Nazification campaign involving schools, local trials and 
the media are largely credited with the evolution in German 
attitudes.15 Moreover, norm internalization in the defendant’s 
community has not been a successful outcome of trials for 
violations of international law since Nuremberg.  This failure leads 
to two questions.  First, why have trials for violations of 
international law failed to internalize norms in the community of 
the defendant?  Second, can trials of Guantanamo detainees 
overcome the deficiencies of the past? 
This Article begins to answer these questions by examining the 
reasons past trials for violations of international law have failed at 
norm internalization.16  From this past practice, this Article 
 
13 A particular set of trials may draw defendants from multiple communities.  
The ICTY prosecuted Serbs, Croats, and to a lesser extent Bosnian Muslims, and 
internalizing respect for international legal norms in all three communities would 
be an aim of norm internalization. 
14 While 78% of Germans initially approved of the IMT as “just,” by 1949 that 
figure had dropped to 38% and by 1952 to 10%, contributing to the sense that the 
IMT’s direct impact on German attitudes was limited.  Martti Koskenniemi, 
Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1, 5–6 (2002). 
15 See MICHAEL A. NEWTON & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, ENEMY OF THE STATE: THE 
TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 211 (2008) (detailing factors that led to 
the post-war attitude changes in Germany). 
16 This Article considered the IMT at Nuremberg, the Tokyo Tribunal, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, and the hybrid tribunal currently operating in Cambodia.  The municipal 
war crimes prosecutions considered were the Israeli trial of Adolf Eichmann and 
the Iraqi High Tribunal.  See Patricia M. Wald, Foreword: War Tales and War Trials, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss2/3
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inductively derives four conditions for norm internalization 
success in the community of the defendant:  consistency, 
selectivity, accessibility, and integration.  While it is impossible to 
conclude that meeting these conditions will produce norm 
internalization success, given the paucity of successful historical 
examples, meeting these conditions will avoid the pitfalls that 
appear to have prevented norm internalization in past trials.  
Application of these conditions to trials of Guantanamo detainees 
reveals that the trials are unlikely to meet these conditions, 
regardless of forum.  Therefore, trials of Guantanamo detainees 
may be more profitably oriented around alternative objectives, 
such as incapacitation or retribution.  More fundamentally, the 
nature and relationship of the four factors presented here suggest 
that trials for violations of international law are a poor vehicle for 
norm internalization. 
This Article will proceed in four Sections.  Section 2 begins by 
providing a brief overview of the theoretical framework 
underlying norm internalization.  This Section considers why norm 
internalization may be preferable to other consequential trial aims, 
such as deterrence.  It also considers why the defendant’s 
community is the typical target audience for such efforts. 
Section 3 examines past trials for violations of international law 
to search for common threads that explain the failure of these trials 
to achieve norm internalization in the community of the defendant.  
These common threads reveal four conditions necessary to avoid 
repetition of past problems with international trials that prevented 
norm internalization success:  consistency, selectivity, accessibility, 
and integration. 
Section 4 applies these conditions to past and future trials of 
Guantanamo detainees for violations of international law.  This 
Section begins by explaining why the problem of Islamic terrorism 
is a paradigmatic case where the desire to use trials to internalize 
an international norm is great.  The remainder of Section 4 looks at 
whether past or future trials of detainees at Guantanamo Bay could 
contribute to internalization of an anti-terrorism norm in the 
Islamic world.  Application of the four conditions to these trials 
suggests that, regardless of forum, the trials are doomed to repeat 
the problems that have plagued past efforts. 
 
106 MICH. L. REV. 901, 907–09 (2008) (providing a useful timeline of international 
criminal tribunals). 
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Section 5 concludes that trials for violations of international law 
seem unlikely to succeed at norm internalization.  This suggests 
trials are more profitably oriented around alternative objectives, 
while alternative routes to norm development are identified. 
2. NORM INTERNALIZATION AS A TRIAL OBJECTIVE FOR 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
Why should trials for violations of international law prioritize 
norm internalization in the community of the defendant?  
Retribution can provide an adequate justification for criminal 
trials, separate and apart from any consequential goals.17  Society 
punishes criminals in order to reset the moral balance that was 
shifted out of kilter by their crimes.18  Nevertheless, the events that 
precede a trial also create a desire that the trial serve consequential 
aims, meaning that the trial help prevent recurrence of the crimes 
in question.  Society desires that the lawbreaking at issue not recur, 
whether from this individual or in society in general.  Deterrence 
and norm internalization provide two different routes to meet this 
consequential aim. 
Deterrence uses the threat of external punishment to enforce 
the law.  As understood by social control theory,19 human 
behavior, like that of Pavlov’s dogs, is influenced by rewards and 
punishments.  Thus, law should dispense benefits and harms in 
such a manner as to induce compliance with the norms preferred 
by society.  Such an approach squares with public choice theory, 
which assumes that people maximize their personal positions in 
relation to the law.  The only way to get an individual to follow the 
law is to create inducements and penalties that weight the 
individual’s cost-benefit analysis to arrive at the socially preferred, 
lawful outcome.  Trials and punishment are the means by which 
society introduces law into the cost-benefit analyses of its citizens.  
Without the certainty of trial and punishment, the rational actor 
will ignore legal prohibitions that are disadvantageous to his 
interests. 
 
17 Retributivists argue that retribution by definition takes precedence over 
consequential aims for trials.  Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of 
Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS (1984), reprinted in READINGS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 520, 547–50 (Jules L. Coleman ed., 1999). 
18 Drumbl, supra note 5, at 1185–86. 
19 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 20–21 (1st ed. 1990) 
(describing social control theory of law). 
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Deterrence cannot fully explain the phenomenon of the law-
abiding citizen, however.  Deterrence turns on the ability of the law 
to punish transgressions, and most free societies lack the resources 
or will to be able to adequately monitor individual behavior to 
ensure that all or even most transgressions are punished.20  Norm 
internalization recognizes this gap, and focuses on developing 
internal drives to follow the law, given that stable compliance with 
the law depends on an internal drive to follow the law regardless 
of enforcement.  The internal drive to follow the law may have two 
sources.21  Personal morality, the individual’s sense of right and 
wrong, can be a powerful influence in deciding to follow the law.  
A person may choose not to murder not only because he will be 
punished severely for doing so, but also because committing 
murder would violate his personal morality.  But not all laws align 
with personal morality.  An alternative internal drive to follow the 
law may come from a sense that the institution promulgating the 
law has legitimate authority to regulate individual behavior, 
regardless of whether a particular law accords with individual 
morality.  Thus, an individual may refrain from smoking 
marijuana neither because he fears getting caught, nor because he 
thinks it is morally wrong, but rather because he accepts the right 
of the external authority promulgating the law to regulate his 
behavior. 
Trials are central to the norm internalization process.  Trials can 
bolster within society the legitimacy of the external authority that 
promulgates law.22  The greater that authority’s legitimacy, the 
greater the likelihood society will comply with that authority’s 
laws regardless of individuals’ independent moral judgments 
about the law.  The law-promulgating authority achieves 
legitimacy by using trial procedures that meet basic due process 
guarantees, imposing penalties that are proportionate to the crime 
being committed, punishing different categories and classes of 
people for the same offenses, and only punishing conduct society 
 
20 See id. at 22–23 (using drunk driving as an example of a crime where social 
control theory cannot explain the decision to abide by the law). Authoritarian 
societies may rely more upon deterrence to enforce laws because of a greater 
willingness to use intrusive means to seek compliance with the law, and because 
of the reduced legitimacy of the government as a behavior regulation agent. 
21 See id. at 25 (summarizing literature on two types of internalized 
obligations). 
22 See Hampton, supra note 17, at 713 (arguing that democratic legitimacy of 
state gives it the authority to morally educate its citizens through criminal law). 
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agrees must be reformed.  The trial can also educate society on 
why the crime was morally unacceptable by dramatizing the 
effects of the wrongdoing and stigmatizing the offender.  Social 
education through trials can be an influential force in shaping a 
society’s collective morality.23 
These general observations about criminal trials can be applied 
to trials for violations of international law.  Such trials generally 
include among their aims retribution for wrongs committed.24  
Retributivists will argue that the heinous crimes that are generally 
the subject of international trials require balancing the moral ledger 
through punishment of the wrongdoer.  But retribution is rarely 
thought to be the only purpose behind such trials, as the 
international community generally also has consequential goals25  
The events that preceded these trials are usually among the most 
heinous known to man, including genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and serious war crimes.  The international community 
seeks to pursue any strategy that might reduce the risk that these 
crimes will be repeated in the future.  Such a strategy generally 
requires focusing on the community of the defendant, who has just 
engaged in illegal conduct, and who may be predisposed to doing 
so again.  This risk makes that community the natural target for 
consequentialist efforts. 
 
23 Uma Narayan has argued that trials are not a vehicle for moral education 
because competency rules require a defendant who understands her actions are 
immoral.  See Uma Narayan, Moral Education and Criminal Punishment, in VALUES 
AND EDUCATION 69, 70 (Thomas Magnell ed., 1998) (“responsibility would be hard 
to attribute to an agent that lacked the understanding that her conduct was 
immoral”).  Certainly, it would violate basic procedural norms to subject an 
incompetent defendant to trial and punishment to further social objectives.  See, 
e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171–72 (1975) (summarizing common law 
history preventing this practice).  Nevertheless, a good faith belief that one’s 
illegal actions are morally correct is insufficient in itself to support a finding of 
incompetence to stand trial.  See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per 
curiam) (requiring only that defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and. . . 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him” to stand 
trial). 
24 See e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 25 (1998) 
(describing the benefits of the retribution achieved in international criminal trials).  
Indeed, this may be the primary aim in most international criminal trials.  
DRUMBL, supra note 6, at 61 (arguing that survey of international criminal trials 
suggests preference for retributivist aims over consequential aims). 
25 DRUMBL, supra note 6, at 60–62 (discussing role of consequential aims in 
international tribunals). 
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Deterrence provides one route towards meeting 
consequentialist goals.  Deterrence would use the threat of trial and 
punishment to alter the individual (specific) or collective (general) 
cost-benefit analyses of the crime in the community of the 
defendant.  Deterrence through threat of prosecution may not 
always be possible, however.26  Deterrence through trials depends 
upon predictability in enforcement of the law and a rational actor, 
neither of which may be present in the context of violations of 
international law.27  Where deterrence is possible, its effects may be 
ephemeral.  Once the external pressure preventing commission of 
the crime is removed, the threat of recidivism may emerge.28 
Norm internalization theory seeks to deal with the limitations 
of deterrence by using trials to inculcate respect for international 
law and for the specific norm at issue in the defendant’s 
community.  Rather than seeking to deter the potential wrongdoer 
through alteration of his cost-benefit analysis, norm internalization 
seeks to modify personal morality, thereby reducing the number of 
people willing to commit atrocities and the social acceptance of 
those who do.  Trials can strengthen respect for international law 
through the use of trial procedures that comport with international 
due process standards.  Trials also internalize the norm in question 
through dramatization of the effects of the wrongdoing and 
stigmatization of the offender.29 
 
26 See Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and 
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT’L SECURITY 5, 21–22 (2003–04) 
(arguing that international criminal trials have failed at deterring violations of 
international law). 
27 See, e.g., DRUMBL, supra note 6, at 170–71 (arguing that deterrence of serious 
violations of international law is unlikely). 
28 It is possible that deterred behavior can morph into that which is morally 
unacceptable.  As political considerations prevent key actors from continuing 
destructive behaviors, society’s willingness to return to that behavior may 
decrease over time.  See Michael Slackman, 5 Years After It Halted Weapons 
Programs, Libya Sees the U.S. as Ungrateful, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at A6 
(explaining that Libya was unlikely to return to terrorist activity despite the 
failure of the United States to live up to promises that initially altered Libya’s cost-
benefit analysis on terrorism). 
29 Trials are just one venue where the effects of war crimes on society are 
dramatized in an effort to reduce future occurrence of the crimes.  Artists, such as 
Jacques Callot or Goya, have for centuries depicted the horrible crimes soldiers 
commit against civilians during armed conflict, in part to shock the viewer 
regarding these events.  See SUSAN SONTAG, REGARDING THE PAIN OF OTHERS 41–43 
(Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2002) (detailing the history of artistic depictions of war 
crimes).  Photographs from war coverage often serve this purpose today. 
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Trials for violations of international law have two advantages 
in advancing norm internalization in the community of the 
defendant.  First, such trials are often the only forum where the 
factual history of serious war crimes and human rights violations 
are developed, as the trials are often conducted in societies where 
alternative fora such as municipal courts or local media have 
broken down or been corrupted by partisan influences.30  The 
power to discover and represent facts provides these trials a 
unique opportunity to shape the historical knowledge of the 
atrocities that transpired.  Graphic accounts of past human rights 
abuses and war crimes may be a powerful tool to internalize norms 
prohibiting such conduct.31  Second, in communities where the 
municipal courts have lost legitimacy due to armed conflict or 
neglect, fair trials have the ability to begin to rebuild respect for 
law and legal institutions, especially international law.  If the 
defendant’s community believes that international law may validly 
restrict its conduct, regardless of whether the law aligns with 
personal morality, there may be a reduced risk of serious violations 
of international law. 
3. FOUR CONDITIONS DERIVED 
3.1. Past Practice 
The closest norm internalization has come to fruition through 
trials for violations of international law were the trials at 
Nuremberg.  The IMT at Nuremberg is remembered today for 
 
30 This may suggest that a truth commission would be an alternative venue to 
push norm internalization, because it may be better than trials at recording the 
history behind severe violations of international law.  But see Jonathan 
Tepperman, TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 128 
(describing criticism that truth commissions fail to uncover the truth because of 
the constructed nature of narratives and prejudices of their framers).  Truth 
commissions are missing a key component of norm internalization efforts, 
however, as they lack the ability to impose a punishment that demonstrates the 
depth of international revulsion towards the act in the question.  Nevertheless, it 
is worth considering in future scholarship whether that drawback is outweighed 
by the benefits of truth commissions, including the fact that they may be less 
likely to be seen as “victor’s justice.” 
31 See Damaška, supra note 6, at 345 (explaining that “exposure and 
stigmatization of these extreme forms of humanity” contributes to “the 
recognition of basic humanity”).  See also SONTAG, supra note 29, at 14–16 
(describing work of novelists, photographers, and filmmakers to graphically 
demonstrate the costs of war in order to prevent its recurrence). 
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creating an authoritative factual history of the crimes committed 
by the Nazi regime, and for employing that history to reorient the 
German population from a militaristic past to its liberal democratic 
present.32  Historians dispute the notion that the IMT was itself 
responsible for this evolution, however, pointing instead to a 
complex series of reeducation efforts and historical events, 
including trials conducted by German authorities of mid-level 
Nazi officials, as an explanation for the inculcation of new values 
in Germany.33  While it is indisputable today that the concept of 
Germans repeating Nazi crimes is inconceivable, the role of 
international trials in this evolution may have been minimal. 
Whatever the cause of the “Nuremberg moment,” it does not 
appear to have been repeated in subsequent war crimes trials.  
While Nuremberg’s version of history is widely lauded as accurate, 
many scholars derisively refer to the narrative produced by the 
Tokyo Tribunal as the “Tokyo Trial version of history,” and today 
the narrative is largely rejected in Japan and even the West.34  This 
has resulted in the continuation of historical disputes between 
Japan and its neighbors stemming from Japan’s refusal to accept 
responsibility for its actions during World War II.35  As for 
subsequent trials, it may be too early to measure their impact on 
norms in the community of the defendant.  Respect for 
international law, and a sense of morality modified to encompass 
prohibitions on genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious 
war crimes must be developed over time; the appropriate 
measurement of success may not be months or years but rather 
decades.  Nevertheless, early signs are not promising.  In Serbia, a 
 
32 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Nuremberg Legacy: Historical Assessment Fifty 
Years Later, in WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG 291, 301–02 (Belinda 
Cooper ed., 1999) (laying out the “moral-ethical legacy” of Nuremberg). 
33 NEWTON & SCHARF, supra note 15.  See also Koskenniemi, supra note 14, at 5–
6 (describing didactic effects of the IMT as “obscure”). 
34 MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 139 (1997) 
(illustrating Japanese perception as the “Tokyo Trial version of history”). 
35 This refusal is demonstrated by the regular visits by Japanese Prime 
Ministers to the Yasukuni shrine, where Japan’s Class A war criminals are buried.  
See Norimitsu Onishi, A War Shrine, for a Japan Seeking a Not-Guilty Verdict, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 2005, at A4 (explaining that rejection of the Tokyo Trials has 
allowed many Japanese to believe that Japan’s wartime conduct was just).  See also 
Martin Fackler & Choe Sang-Hun, Japanese Researchers Rebut Premier’s Denials on 
Sex Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2007, at A3 (explaining that conservative Japanese 
have used the Tokyo Tribunal’s reputation as “victors’ justice” to disavow the 
conclusion that the Japanese military had been involved in sex slavery during 
World War II). 
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2002 survey indicated that only 20% of Serbs believed that 
cooperation with the ICTY was “morally right” and only 10% saw 
the ICTY as the best way to serve justice.36  These numbers suggest 
that the ICTY’s impact on Serb morality or perceptions of the 
legitimacy of international law has been minimal to date.37  In 
Cambodia, only 15% of people were aware of the mixed tribunal 
convened there to hear war crimes cases against former Khmer 
Rouge leaders before the hearings started, and many Cambodians 
remained unaware of the trials or the genocide that spawned them 
even as trials proceeded.38  Low levels of popular knowledge about 
trials suggest a minimal future impact on society. 
Why have trials struggled to achieve internalization of 
international norms in the community of the defendant?  This 
Section proceeds in an inductive manner, identifying four common 
threads that may explain these failures:  perceptions of victor’s 
justice; selection problems; limited access to information; and 
failure to situate trials within a larger social norm internalization 
effort.  As with any exercise in inductive reasoning, the goal here is 
not a formal proof of the reasons that norm internalization failed in 
the past.  Rather, past pitfalls suggest what may need to be avoided 
if future trials for violations of international law are to have norm 
internalization success.  The following Section uses these past 
failings to develop four conditions that must be met to avoid past 
norm internalization problems: consistency, selectivity, 
accessibility and integration. 
3.1.1. Victor’s Justice 
Hermann Göring, Nazi Reichsmarschall and convicted war 
criminal, scrawled on his indictment by the International Military 
Tribunal (“IMT”) at Nuremberg, “The victor will always be the 
 
36 Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 26, at 21–22. 
37 Serbian leaders have cooperated with the ICTY at times in the hopes that 
doing so will improve their chances of joining the EU.  See Nicholas Wood, Serbia 
Acts on War Crimes to Strengthen Ties to West, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2005, at A11.  But 
such cooperation is not indicative of the deeper social change required to ensure 
the conduct will not recur in the future.  See id. (quoting Human Rights Watch 
Serbia Montenegro and Bosnia Director Bogdan Ivanisevic, “[a]bsolutely nothing 
in how the government is cooperating with The Hague tribunal would affect the 
way a person in the street thinks about war crimes.”). 
38 Seth Mydans, Young Cambodians are Oblivious of Khmer Rouge Horrors, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009, at A6 (detailing how Cambodians under thirty years old are 
unaware of the tribunals). 
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judge and the vanquished the accused.”39  As Göring’s remark 
presages, international war crimes trials have struggled to 
overcome the perception within the accused’s community that they 
represent illegitimate “victor’s justice.”  This notion interferes with 
norm internalization by casting the trial as an arbitrary exercise of  
raw power by the war’s winner, as opposed to an objective 
condemnation of illegal acts.  If trials are perceived as an effort to 
subjugate the defendant’s community, the community will neither 
develop greater respect for international law nor learn the 
importance of adhering to international norms. 
The perception of victor’s justice arises for at least two reasons.  
First, international war crimes trials often reflect a change of legal 
regime, from that of the vanquished—which tolerated, and in some 
instances codified, the acts being prosecuted—to that of 
international law—which condemns those acts.40  This change in 
legal authority can make criminalization of past acts appear ex post 
facto, even if the international law in question was well established 
at the time of the underlying offense.  Second, the community of 
the accused is particularly susceptible to perceptions of victor’s 
justice because of its natural skepticism of the accuser, who is 
usually somehow linked to the conflict’s winner.  In the face of that 
skepticism, any international law violations by the accuser 
undermine his standing as a prosecutor.  International war crimes 
trials have fed into this skepticism by failing to prosecute the 
crimes of all sides in a conflict.  Sometimes this is as simple as 
limiting the jurisdiction of the tribunal to crimes committed by one 
side in the conflict;41 other times seemingly neutral authorizing 
statutes have imbedded conditions that prevent the tribunal from 
taking full account of the events that led to trial.42  Failure to deal 
 
39 NEWTON & SCHARF, supra note 15, at 99–100. 
40 See, e.g, Jörg Friedrich, Nuremberg and the Germans, in WAR CRIMES: THE 
LEGACY OF NUREMBERG, supra note 32, at 87–89 (describing the dissonance 
experienced by post-war Germans who saw actions that were legitimate under 
Nazi law labeled criminal under the Allied law). 
41 Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, available 
at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp#art/ (explicitly limiting 
jurisdiction to “trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European 
Axis”). 
42 For example, by limiting the statute of the ICTR to crimes committed in 
1994, the ICTR excluded from its scope consideration of atrocities committed by 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”) against the previous Hutu-led government 
from 1990-93.  See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, PROSECUTING GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: A 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
 
442 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:2 
with the crimes committed by the accuser quickly discredits the 
trial in the eyes of the community of the accused, both as a fact-
finding exercise and as a moral guidepost.43 
The post-World War II tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo 
were victor’s justice in the truest sense of the term: they were 
conceived of and conducted by the victorious Allies at the end of 
the war.44  Not surprisingly, they displayed both features that 
allowed the accused’s community to dismiss the trials as victor’s 
justice.  Both tribunals criminalized conduct that was legal in 
Germany or Japan at the time it was conducted, and which was not 
clearly a criminal violation of international law.  Many top Nazi 
and Japanese officials were tried for the crime of aggression even 
though it was not a criminal violation of international law prior to 
World War II,45 and remains ill-defined today.46  The post-World 
War II tribunals failed to recognize the traditionally accepted 
defense of superior orders, holding lower level officials fully liable 
for conduct that they were ordered to perform.47  Also, the IMT 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON THE ICTR AND NATIONAL TRIALS pt. III (1997) (describing 
effects of ICTR’s limited temporal jurisdiction). 
43 See OSIEL, supra note 34, at 124–25 (describing the problem of accusers with 
“unclean hands”); Damaška, supra note 6, at 361 (noting that “corrosive cynicism 
engendered by the perception of double standards” is mostly likely to occur in the 
community where atrocities were committed). 
44 See Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/342 (Aug. 29, 
1994) (explaining how the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals were 
organized). 
45 See Christopher P. DeNicola, Comment, A Shield for the “Knights of 
Humanity”: The ICC Should Adopt a Humanitarian Necessity Defense to the Crime of 
Aggression, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 641, 647–48 (2008) (describing the “shaky ground” 
of IMT aggression prosecutions because of “nullum crimen sine lege” concerns).  
See TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE 
NUERNBERG (sic) WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10  219 
(1949), for a discussion of how those involved in the IMT acknowledged these 
concerns, but argued that there was no such problem because any reasonable 
defendant would have understood the wrongness of his actions. 
46 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5(2), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (“The Court shall exercise jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with 
articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which 
the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.”). 
47 See Martha Minow, Living Up to Rules: Holding Soldiers Responsible for 
Abusive Conduct and the Dilemma of the Superior Orders Defence, 52 MCGILL L.J. 1, 17 
(2007) (describing break in traditional practice at Nuremberg).  See also, Damaška, 
supra note 6, at 353 (explaining how dispensing with the superior orders defense 
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and Tokyo Tribunals prosecuted only Axis criminals, a form of 
selective condemnation that created the perception of hypocrisy.  
The Allies sat in judgment of Axis war crimes, while alleged Allied 
war crimes—including Stalin’s massacres, the British and U.S. 
firebombing of Dresden,48 and the U.S. decision to use the atomic 
bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki—were not investigated.49 
The modern international war crimes tribunals prosecuting 
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and in 
Rwanda (“ICTR”) have two significant differences from the post-
World War II tribunals.  First, the U.N. Security Council, which 
created the tribunals, did not formally engage on either side in the 
armed conflict.50  Second, the mandates of both tribunals 
encompassed potential violations by all sides to the conflict.51  
Nevertheless, allegations of “victor’s justice” have plagued both 
tribunals.  The ICTY has an inconsistent stance on prosecuting ex 
post facto offenses since the prohibition on such prosecutions is 
subject to subordination when the ICTY’s sense of substantive 
justice requires that the case proceed.52  The ICTY and ICTR also 
 
blurs levels of moral culpability recognized in municipal legal systems, thereby 
undermining the moral education offered by trial). 
48 See Koskenniemi, supra note 14, at 21 (alleging that the Allies had skeletons 
in their closets too). 
49 See OSIEL, supra note 34, at 122, n.139 (stating that the Allied bombing of 
large Axis population centers including, inter alia, the atomic attacks on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were war crimes). 
50 See S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the 
ICTR); S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the 
ICTY). 
51 The ICTY Statute defines the jurisdiction of the tribunal as extending to 
“persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with 
the provisions of the present Statute,” and makes no distinction between potential 
defendant groups.  Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia art. 1, May 25, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827.  Similarly, the ICTR Statute 
grants the tribunal jurisdiction “to prosecute persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda 
and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory 
of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in 
accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.”  Statute for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 1, Nov. 8, 1994, U.N. Doc. 
S/Res/1534 [hereinafter ICTR Implementing Statute]. 
52 See Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Law Making at the 
Intersection of Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119, 140–41 (2008) (explaining that the 
principle of “nullen crimen sine lege” is more flexible at ICTY than in municipal 
courts and gives way where considerations of justice balance in favor of 
permitting prosecution). 
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have no clear prohibition on the use of hearsay evidence and allow 
evidence from anonymous witnesses to be admitted on a regular 
basis at trials.53  One commentator has argued that this practice 
“call[s] into question the fairness of the underlying trials.”54  
Moreover, neither has consistently prosecuted the crimes of all 
parties to the conflict.  The ICTY failed to open a formal 
investigation into allegations of war crimes stemming from the 
NATO air campaign in Yugoslavia.55  Croatia also succeeded in 
delaying prosecution of its war criminals at the ICTY, further 
alienating Serbs from the tribunal.56  These decisions allowed 
former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to make credible 
claims of victor’s justice, arguing that the court was “false,” and 
“invented as [a] reprisal for disobedient representatives of a 
disobedient people.”57  The ICTR suffered from similar problems, 
as the U.S. and other Security Council members allegedly pushed 
out former chief prosecutor Carla del Ponte, at least partially 
because she began to investigate massacres of Hutus committed by 
the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”), which currently 
 
53 David Aronofsky, International War Crimes & Other Criminal Courts: Ten 
Recommendations for Where We Go From Here and How to Get There—Looking to a 
Permanent International Criminal Tribunal, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 17, 24–25 
(2006). 
54 Id. at 24. 
55 ICTY chief prosecutor Carla del Ponte announced that she was declining to 
open an investigation into war crimes allegations stemming from the NATO 
bombing campaign because she was “satisfied that there was no deliberate 
targeting of civilians or unlawful military targets by NATO during the 
campaign.”  Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor’s Report on the NATO Bombing 
Campaign U.N. Doc. PR/P.I.S./510-e (June 13, 2000), available at 
http://www.icty.org/sid/7846.  But see Anne-Sophie Massa, NATO’s Intervention 
in Kosovo and the Decision of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for the 
Former Yugoslavia Not to Investigate: An Abusive Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 
24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 610, 644–45 (2006), for a criticism of the ICTY’s decision not 
to investigate NATO’s actions as politically motivated. 
56 See Victor Peskin, Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the 
Winners at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
4 J. HUM. RTS. 213, 218–19 (2005) (detailing efforts of the Tudjman government to 
obstruct ICTY investigation of Croatian atrocities).  Former Croatian President 
Franjo Tudjman is believed to have orchestrated an ethnic cleansing campaign 
against Serbs, driving 150,000–200,000 Serbs out of Croatia during the war.  Id. at 
216. 
57 Gary J. Bass, Op.-Ed., Why Not Victor’s Justice, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2002, at 
A33 (quoting Milosevic). 
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governs Rwanda.58  Not surprisingly, some Hutus resent the 
failure of the ICTR to prosecute Tutsis who violated the laws of 
war.59 
Trials conducted by an accused’s municipal court are also 
susceptible to as the label of “victor’s justice.”  Iraqis insisted that 
trials of Baathist leaders conducted after the 2003 U.S. invasion of 
Iraq be conducted by Iraqis, largely to preserve the legitimacy of 
the trials with the Iraqi people.60  Nevertheless, in a fractured 
society like Iraq, sub-groups that feel alienated from the 
government will not view trials conducted by a government 
dominated by another sub-group as inherently legitimate.  Many 
Sunnis—the community of most Baathist defendants—dismissed 
the trials of Saddam Hussein’s regime conducted by the Iraqi High 
Tribunal as Shiite victor’s justice.61  Iraqi authorities unwittingly 
bolstered this impression by executing Saddam on a Sunni holy 
day, contrary to Iraqi law.62 
3.1.2. Selection Problems 
International war crimes trials have failed to consistently 
prosecute the most important defendants for the most important 
crimes, which include the possibility of imposing the most 
important sentences.  Prosecuting minor figures can undermine 
norm internalization by failing to create a sufficiently dramatic 
spectacle to communicate the perils of transgressing international 
law and express the stigma associated with such violations.  The 
defendant’s community will not develop greater respect for 
international law, nor internalize international norms, if the trial’s 
narrative is insufficiently powerful to spawn moral reflection. 
 
58 See Peskin, supra note 56, at 225–26 (alleging that the United States did not 
want the RPF prosecuted). 
59 See Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as 
Transitional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 62 (2006) (quoting a Hutu man who had fled 
to Burundi as asking, “How come those who killed Hutu are not prosecuted?”). 
60 See NEWTON & SCHARF, supra note 15, at 55 (explaining that Iraqis rejected a 
U.N. Security Council tribunal because it would lack legitimacy among Iraqis). 
61 See Sabrina Tavernise, In a Divided Iraq, Reaction to Saddam Death Sentence 
Conforms to Sectarian Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006, at A11 (quoting a Sunni 
doctor who discounted Saddam’s trial and verdict based on the government’s 
continued support of Shiite militias). 
62 See Marc Santora et al., Saddam Hussein Hanged in Baghdad; Swift End to 
Drama; Troops on Alert, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2006, at A1 (explaining that the 
execution was carried out on the Sunni holiday Eid al-Adha, seemingly contrary 
to Iraqi law). 
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Trials for violations of international law frequently have failed 
to prosecute the most important perpetrators of crimes.  Sometimes 
this is because potential defendants are not available for trial.  
Many high-ranking members of the Khmer Rouge, including Pol 
Pot, died before the mixed tribunal in Cambodia began its 
prosecutions.63  The ICTY has been unable to prosecute Bosnian 
Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic because they 
eluded capture for many years;64 while its attempt to prosecute 
Serbia’s former President Slobodan Milosevic was cut short when 
he died during trial.65  Other times politics plays a role.  The United 
States made a political decision after World War II that the Tokyo 
Tribunals would not prosecute Emperor Hirohito—a choice that 
allowed him to retain his throne, but prevented the trials from 
unearthing his role in Japan’s wartime atrocities.66 
The failure to prosecute the most culpable defendants is 
compounded by the emphasis on prosecution of relatively minor 
crimes.  Sometimes the prosecution is precluded from prosecuting 
the most important crimes by a limited jurisdiction.  The IMT has 
been criticized for interpreting its statute not to include pre-World 
War II crimes committed by the Nazis against its own Jewish 
citizens,67 resulting in a narrative that insufficiently appreciates the 
scope of Nazi crimes against Jews.68  Similarly, the ICTR was 
limited to prosecuting events that occurred during selected months 
 
63 See Seth Mydans, First on Cambodia’s Docket: A Man Whose Jail Sent 14,000 to 
a Killing Field, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at A5 (noting that some Cambodians fear 
more defendants will die before being brought to trial). 
64 See Dan Bilefsky, Karadzic Sent to Hague for Trial Despite Violent Protest by 
Loyalists, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, at A9, for a discussion of how Karadzic was 
finally arrested and sent to The Hague for trial in the summer of 2008.  
Meanwhile, Mladic remains free.  See Thom Shanker, In Serbia, Top U.S. Officer 
Seeks Military Cooperation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, at A13 (describing efforts by 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, to push Serbia to 
increase its effort to capture Mladic). 
65 See generally DRUMBL, supra note 5, (describing the expressive value of 
prosecuting a living perpetrator of war crimes). 
66 OSIEL, supra note 34, at 184–85. 
67 See DOUGLAS, supra note 6, at 48 (explaining that while Article 6(c) of the 
IMT Charter did allow for prosecution of crimes against humanity, the IMT 
judges determined the jurisdictional scope of the charge was limited to crimes 
committed in “execution of or in connection with” crimes against peace or war 
crimes). 
68 See id. at 57 (explaining that the narrator of the legendary film Nazi 
Concentration Camps only mentions “Jew” once because of the expansive scope of  
the crimes prosecuted at Nuremberg). 
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of 1994, preventing it from fully prosecuting crimes committed by 
all sides in Rwanda.69  Plea-bargaining can also prevent the trial 
authority from prosecuting the gravest crimes.  Plea-bargaining 
away the most serious charges in return for a guilty plea on less 
serious charges means that factual histories are not developed for 
important charges, or are developed in a diminished manner and 
are therefore forgotten.70  ICTY prosecutors, for example, have in 
many cases accepted plea-bargains for lesser charges in exchange 
for dropping the charge of genocide, thus stunting the full 
appreciation of the genocide’s magnitude.71 
Even where an important defendant is prosecuted and 
convicted for an important crime, the sentence can send an 
incorrect message about the narrative in question and the power of 
the norm at issue.  In Rwanda, where punishment by death is an 
accepted penalty for the most serious crimes, the absence of the 
death penalty at the ICTR has degraded the significance of the 
crimes among the Hutu audience.72  It may be impossible to 
convey the seriousness of violations of international law if they are 
punished less severely than common crimes.  By contrast, 
undignified executions, such as that of Saddam Hussein, can also 
undermine norm internalization, as they call into question the 
legitimacy of the external authority that allowed such events to 
take place.73 
3.1.3. Access to Information 
Another difficulty norm internalization has faced is the 
inaccessibility of trials to the average person.  Most people receive 
 
69 See ICTR Implementing Statute, supra note 51 (explaining ICTR jurisdiction 
extended only to events which took place in 1994). 
70 DRUMBL, supra note 6, at 179. 
71 See e.g., id. (describing the cases of Plavšić and Simić, who were never 
prosecuted for the most serious crimes of which they were accused because of 
plea-bargaining). 
72 See Jens D. Ohlin, Applying the Death Penalty to Crimes of Genocide, 99 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 747, 748 (2005) (describing the dissonance resulting from prohibition on 
capital punishment in the ICTR, while less serious common criminals receive 
death sentences in Rwandan municipal courts).  See also Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of 
States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 415 (1999) (noting 
the inconsistencies created where those guilty of massive human rights tragedies 
are given lesser sentences than common criminals). 
73 See NEWTON & SCHARF, supra note 15, at 214–15 (stating that the conduct of 
Saddam’s executioners will always “cloud the historic perception of the fairness 
and legitimacy of the Iraqi High Tribunal”). 
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their information about trials from the media because usually only 
the media is positioned to translate the complexities of the legal 
form for lay audiences.74  Because the media serves as a filter 
between the trial itself and the public, it can color the portrayal and 
thereby undermine public confidence in the trials.  This problem 
can manifest itself in at least three ways.  First, the media may 
genuinely not understand the law, or may portray it in misleading 
or oversimplified ways.  During the Nuremberg trials, newspapers 
within the United States were very active in conveying information 
and opinions to the American public about the trials.  
Nevertheless, few newspapers covered serious criticisms about the 
IMT’s use of ex post facto offenses because they generally lacked a 
sufficiently nuanced understanding of the issue.75  The result was 
that most of the American public approved of the trials without 
knowledge of their most important legal defect.76  While in this 
case media ignorance actually bolstered the trial’s legitimacy in the 
community of the accuser, the effect is likely to be more pernicious 
where the media is less inclined to support the trials. 
 
74 See WILLIAM J. BOSCH, JUDGMENT ON NUREMBERG: AMERICAN ATTITUDES 
TOWARD THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR-CRIMES TRIALS 88 (1970) (explaining that the 
average American learned about the Nuremberg trials from newspapers and 
magazines); David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional 
Television, and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 
785, 796 (1993) (explaining that television is the source most Americans use to 
receive information about legal issues); Elliot E. Slotnick, Television News and the 
Supreme Court: A Case Study, 77 JUDICATURE 21 (1993) (explaining that media has an 
exclusive role in communicating the importance of U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
to the American people).  Undoubtedly, the internet revolution that post-dates the 
work of Bosch, Harris, and Slotnick has provided another media outlet to rival 
newspapers and television news in providing information about trials. 
75 See BOSCH, supra note 74, at 99 (explaining that few newspapers covered 
concerns about the use of ex post facto laws “because few editors comprehended 
the objection”).  Newspaper coverage was limited despite the criticism of ex post 
facto charges by Senator Robert Taft and others.  See Senator Robert A. Taft, Equal 
Justice Under the Law, Address at Kenyon College (Oct. 5, 1946) (condemning 
Nuremberg trials because, inter alia, they “violate the fundamental principle of 
American law that a man cannot be tried under an ex post facto statute”).  See also, 
JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 216 (1955) (quoting Supreme Court Justice 
William O. Douglas: “[T]he crime for which the Nazis were tried had never been 
formalized as a crime with the definiteness required by our legal standards . . . 
Goering [sic] et al. deserved severe punishment.  But their guilt did not justify us 
in substituting power for principle.”). 
76 See BOSCH, supra note 74, at 109 (noting that polls showed 75% of 
Americans approved of the Nuremberg trials—a figure that matched the 69% of 
columnists, 73% of newspapers, and 75% of periodicals that supported the trials). 
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Second, ignorance is often linked to bias against the accuser 
and the trials.  A community, including its media, will be more 
skeptical of trials of its members that are conducted outside of the 
country because of the risk that the prosecutions are in fact  
engaging in “victor’s justice,” and media coverage may reflect this 
bias.  Legal professionals in Bosnia and Herzegovina have 
complained that the information they receive from the local media 
about the ICTY is slanted by the nationalist fervor of the media 
outlets serving each of the Bosnian ethnic groups.  Serbs, Croats, 
and Bosnian Muslims shared the concern that their respective 
outlets were substituting their political judgments for actual 
reporting.77  Powerful groups opposed to the expressive message 
of the trials may manipulate media bias to turn public opinion 
against the trials as well.  The clergy, looking to reassert its role in 
German society after World War II, used their relatively untainted 
position to use the German media to turn the German public 
against the IMT.78  Where the media uses its biases to undermine 
support for the trial in the community of the defendant, the 
effectiveness of the planned moral education is reduced. 
Third, media coverage tends towards the sensational, and at 
trial this may mean a disproportionate focus on the antics of the 
defendant.  The British initially opposed an American proposal to 
try Nazi leaders in part because they feared the defendants would 
use the trials as propaganda to convince Germans and the 
international community that the trials were a farce, perhaps 
becoming martyrs in the process.79  Defendants in war crimes trials 
have often acted as the British feared, presenting their defense in 
the court of public opinion.  When they do, the media is too willing 
to focus on their antics, especially where prosecutors choose to 
present their evidence in less dramatic ways.  The Nuremberg 
trials may be better remembered for the performance of Hermann 
Göring than for the prosecution’s case, which chief prosecutor 
 
77 Human Rights Ctr. & the Int’l Human Rights Law Clinic, Univ. of Cal., 
Berkeley & Ctr. Human Rights, University of Sarajevo, Justice, Accountability and 
Social Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors, 18 
BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 102, 140 (2000) (detailing the lack of information provided to 
citizenry and the nationalist slant of local news reporting that did exist). 
78 See JÖRG FRIEDRICH, Nuremberg and the Germans, in WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY 
OF NUREMBERG, supra note 40, at 93–95 (critiquing the clergy’s post-war attitude 
towards war crimes prosecutions). 
79 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, The Nuremberg Legacy: Historical Assessment Fifty Years 
Later, in WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG, supra note 32, at 294. 
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Robert Jackson chose to make through a treasure trove of 
documentary evidence.80  Media coverage of the Iraqi High 
Tribunal was dominated by the theatrical outbursts of Saddam 
Hussein, often even overshadowing dramatic victim testimony 
from those harmed by Saddam’s regime.81  These performances by 
defendants can subvert the historical record created by the trial 
insofar as they create an alternative narrative that reduces the 
power of the norm intended to be projected. 
3.1.4. Trials as Part of a Larger Norm Internalization Effort 
Trials since Nuremberg have failed to integrate trials for 
violations of international law into larger social re-education 
efforts.  If the IMT did have an impact on the change in German 
attitudes after World War II, that change is generally attributed to 
the complementary work of German and international actors who 
built upon the IMT through an intensive de-Nazification campaign 
that used media, education and the local courts to inculcate respect 
for international law.82  Given the large number of alternative and 
more powerful institutions contributing to norm development, 
trials alone cannot succeed in internalizing international legal 
prohibitions.  Instead, the effects of the trials are likely to be 
significant only as an ever larger number of local actors, who have 
internalized the norms in question and used local institutions, such 
as Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”), local social 
movements, media, religious houses and educational institutions, 
to deepen social commitment to the norms.83 
Practice indicates, however, that trials for violations of 
international law since Nuremberg have generally been conducted 
with indifference, at best, and hostility, at worst, towards local 
 
80 See DOUGLAS, supra note 6, at 11, 18, 19–20 (noting how the Nuremberg trial 
was described both as a “citadel of boredeom” and, at other times, a “moment of 
hight drama”). 
81 See NEWTON & SCHARF, supra note 15, at 3 (describing how Saddam’s 
“animal magnetism” and “powerful and aggressive manner” competed with the 
court for control over the trial).  But see DRUMBL, supra note 6, at 178–79 (arguing 
that IHT did a much better job than ICTY of controlling the trial process). 
82 See NEWTON & SCHARF, supra note 15, at 211 (attributing changed German 
attitudes today in large part to post-World War II changes to German law, 
education, and popular culture). 
83 Cf. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: 
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 9 (1998) (listing major actors in 
international advocacy networks). 
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institutions in the community of the defendant.  This problem is 
evident in the relationship between international tribunals and 
municipal courts in the community of the defendant.  International 
or mixed tribunals have taken precedence over municipal justice 
and fact-finding efforts, and in the process, they have missed out 
on opportunities to co-opt local courts in norm inculcation efforts.  
Both the ICTY and ICTR claimed primary jurisdiction over crimes 
within their mandate, consequently ignoring the power of 
municipal judges and lawyers to augment norm internalization 
efforts.  The Human Rights Center at the University of Berkeley 
interviewed 32 Bosnian judges in 1999 on their relationship with 
the ICTY.  Those interviews revealed that Bosnian judges knew 
very little about the institution, despite an outreach effort, and that 
many judges believed that the ICTY had prevented the Bosnian 
courts from developing the expertise needed to pursue 
supplementary war crimes prosecutions on their own.84  In 
Rwanda, the ICTR was granted primacy over the objection of the 
Rwandan government, which wanted trials conducted in Rwanda 
with the participation of the Rwandan judiciary.85  Because the 
Rwandan judiciary was not included in the trial process, a 
potentially powerful ally was excluded from the norm 
internalization effort.86 
Post-Nuremberg trials for violations of international law have 
missed opportunities to achieve synergies with other institutions in 
society as well.  The Iraqi High Tribunal was constructed with an 
eye toward maintaining Iraqi control over the prosecution of Baath 
Party officials, including Saddam Hussein, for violations of 
international law committed by that regime.87  But the power of 
trials to internalize international legal norms among Iraqi Sunnis, 
the community of the defendant, was greatly reduced by the 
failure to integrate the message emanating from trial with broader 
re-education efforts among Sunnis.  Indeed, the government did 
the opposite: continuing with intense de-Baathification efforts 
 
84 See Human Rights Ctr. & the Int’l Human Rights Law Clinic, Univ. of Cal., 
Berkeley, & Ctr. Human Rights, University of Sarajevo supra note 77, at 139–40 
(detailing various judges’ responses). 
85 Alvarez, supra note 72, at 393. 
86 See id. at 404 (discussing how use of a municipal tribunal would have 
improved Rwandans’ access to international proceedings). 
87 See NEWTON & SCHARF, supra note 15, at 55 (explaining that Iraqis preferred 
to run their own trials of Saddam to preserve the legitimacy of the trials with the 
Iraqi people). 
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aimed at excluding Sunnis from Iraqi society, while supporting 
Shiite militias that were engaged in extrajudicial killings of 
Sunnis.88  The result was a failure to reinforce the historical 
narrative of Baath Party crimes developed during the trials —a 
failure that undermined the impact of the trials themselves.  The 
ICTY similarly neglected to integrate its trial efforts with broader 
social re-education efforts in the former Yugoslavia; thus, allowing 
opposition to trials, and the norms projected from them, to persist 
in the media.89 
3.2. Four Conditions 
Avoiding the problems that appear to have prevented past 
trials from internalizing international norms in the community of 
the defendant is a good starting point for norm internalization 
success.  Past practice suggests four necessary, but not necessarily 
sufficient, conditions for successful norm internalization: 
consistency, selectivity, transparency, and integration.  Two points 
are worth noting here about these conditions.  First, because they 
were derived inductively, they are designed merely to be 
hypotheses based on observations of past facts.  Second, meeting 
these conditions may not result in future norm internalization 
success.  The paucity of past norm internalization success stories 
prevents any conclusion about what would be sufficient to achieve 
success.  Rather, these conditions are required to avoid problems 
that appear to have prevented norm internalization in past 
practice. 
The first condition for success in norm internalization is 
consistency.  The trial authority must act consistently in applying 
international law in order to avoid the perception in the target 
audience that the trials represent victor’s justice.  Such perceptions 
have eroded the impact of past trials on norm development 
because target audiences have refused to draw lessons from trials 
perceived as arbitrary.  Consistency can overcome this perception 
by demonstrating that the trial authority’s interest in conducting 
 
88 See Edward Wong, Shiite Cleric Opposes U.S. Plan to Permit Former Baath 
Party Members to Join Government, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at A1 (describing the 
continued push by Shiite religious leaders to marginalize Sunnis through de-
Baathification campaign). 
89 See Human Rights Ctr. & the Int’l Human Rights Law Clinic, Univ. of Cal., 
Berkeley& Ctr. Human Rights, University of Sarajevo, supra note 77, at 140 
(explaining that prejudices of Bosnian media kept accurate ICTY information from 
reaching the Bosnian public). 
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the trial is upholding international law, as opposed to continued 
prosecution of a recently completed war.  The most obvious step in 
this direction is that any trial for violation of international law be 
conducted consistently with minimum international standards 
with respect to due process for the defendant.90  All past trials 
analyzed here have deviated from these standards, be it with 
respect to the crimes charged,91 defenses recognized,92 or evidence 
admitted,93 thus inviting the charge that the trials were “show 
trials.”94  Crooked trials, though more effective in terms of securing 
convictions of defendants, are not venues for moral education 
because the historical narrative produced at such a trial will not be 
accepted as accurate by the defendant’s community.95  Less 
obvious is that the trial authority must be willing to prosecute 
violations of international law committed by all sides to the 
conflict.96  Here, too, most past trials studied fell short, as most 
selectively prosecuted crimes committed by the loser in the 
conflict, while leaving the winner’s crimes unaddressed.97  But 
consistently applying international law, regardless of the actor to 
whom it is being applied, is essential to the trial’s message being 
accepted as a moral judgment by the international community, and 
 
90 See DOUGLAS, supra note 6, at 3 (noting the pedagogical benefits of 
conducting trials according to the “sober authority of the rule of law”). 
91 See supra text accompanying note 40 (discussing ex post facto problems 
with charging defendants with the crime of aggression). 
92 See supra text accompanying note 47 (describing deviations from traditional 
practice at Nuremberg and Tokyo in disallowing a superior orders defense). 
93 See Aronfsky, supra note 53 (explaining how extensive admission of 
hearsay evidence at ICTY and ICTR may be undermining the fairness of trials). 
94 See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 232 (1963) (arguing 
that using trials for pedagogic purposes creates show trials by “detract[ing] from 
the law’s main business: to weigh the charges brought against the accused, to 
render judgment and to mete out just punishment”). 
95 This is not to say that there may not be such a thing as too much due 
process for a defendant.  Mark Drumbl has pointed out that too many procedural 
protections for the defendant may allow him to grandstand at trial, thereby 
disrupting the trial’s narrative.  Drumbl, supra note 5, at 1188. 
96 Mirjan Damaška has called this problem “selectivity of enforcement,” 
noting that most trials for violations of international law are directed at “citizens 
of states that are weak actors in the international arena.”  Damaška, supra note 6, 
at 360–361. 
97 See supra text accompanying notes 42–43 & 49–53 (detailing instances 
where only crimes of the defeated in a conflict were prosecuted). 
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not another attempt by the armed conflict’s winner to subjugate 
the loser.98 
Two responses to this last point are worth noting here.  First, 
Mirjan Damaska explains that it is unrealistic to expect that war 
crimes from all sides of an armed conflict will be prosecuted, and 
that this problem of selective enforcement should not prevent 
prosecution where possible.99  While Damaska recognizes that such 
a prosecution pattern can engender “corrosive cynicism” in the 
community of the defendant, he believes this may be overcome if 
that community is convinced that the trials in question benefit 
them through reduced risk of future violence.100  Damaska does not 
explain, however, how trials selectively enforcing international law 
against the defendant’s community will contribute to reducing 
violence directed against that community.  One source of reduced 
violence may be an end to violations of international law within 
the defendant’s community itself.  But trials will achieve this goal 
through norm internalization only if either the norm in question 
matches the personal morality of the community (a scenario that is 
unlikely in a community where violations were recently 
widespread), or because international law is accepted as a 
legitimate regulatory agent.  The “corrosive cynicism” Damaska 
acknowledges would appear to prevent such acceptance.  Another 
path to reduced violence would be to prevent the commission of 
future crimes against the community of the defendant by the 
community of the victor.  But it is unlikely the community of the 
victor will be deterred from future atrocities when that community 
enjoys impunity for past committed crimes. 
Second, some may worry that consistency in application of 
international law risks blurring the message on wrongdoing.  Mark 
 
98 Adam Smith argues that consistency not only requires prosecuting all 
crimes in the contemporary conflict at issue, but also taking into account historical 
crimes that contributed to the current situation.  ADAM M. SMITH, AFTER GENOCIDE: 
BRINGING THE DEVIL TO JUSTICE 131–37 (2009) (detailing how the ICTR, ICTY, and 
the Special Court in Sierra Leone could have enjoyed greater legitimacy had their 
respective jurisdictions dipped further back into history).  It is hard to imagine 
how such a suggestion could be practically implemented, however, given the 
ancient roots of many disputes that lead to massive human rights and 
humanitarian law violations. 
99 I am not, in Damaška’s words, “an ironic academic scherzo” arguing that 
lack of consistency means there should be no prosecution at all.  I am merely 
arguing that norm internalization will not succeed in the face of selective 
prosecution. 
100 Damaška, supra note 6, at 360–62. 
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Osiel has noted that one argument made against prosecuting 
crimes by all sides of a conflict is that it may imply a sense of moral 
equivalency regarding wrongdoing in the war.101  This response 
misses the ultimate point of the trials under norm internalization 
theory.  Norm internalization requires acceptance by the audience 
of the accuracy of the narrative developed at trial, and as Osiel 
himself explains, it is that accuracy that is at question where the 
crimes of all sides are not prosecuted.102  The different narratives 
produced by different crimes can be sorted through by the target 
audience, with each narrative assigned its appropriate level of 
moral opprobrium. 
The second condition for success is selectivity.  Successful norm 
internalization depends on sufficiently spectacular trials that 
dramatize the effect of international law violations, followed by 
serious punishment stigmatizing the atrocities.  Past trials have 
failed to create such spectacles because they have not prosecuted 
the most serious offenders for the most serious charges.103  Such 
narratives are unlikely to reach popular society, thus ensuring that 
the trial will have little impact in norm development.  Past trials 
have also failed in not sentencing those convicted of the most 
serious crimes to sentences indicative of the nature of the crime in 
question, allowing audiences to shrug off serious wrongdoing.104  
Selectivity addresses this problem by limiting prosecutions to the 
most important defendants for the most important charges.105  
Selectivity also means sentencing those convicted of the most 
serious crimes to sentences that will indicate to the target audience 
the seriousness of the wrongdoing involved.106  Such prosecutions 
can penetrate popular consciousness because the graphic tales they 
depict are the most likely to generate significant media attention 
amid a glut of atrocious stories and images. 
 
101 OSIEL, supra note 34, at 124–125. 
102 See id. at 125. 
103 See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect 
of shorter sentences. 
104 See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of 
capital punishment’s absence in international trials). 
105 Selectivity also presumes that prosecutions for these major charges 
proceed and are not merely plead out.  See DRUMBL, supra note 6, at 179 
(discussing the narrative problems created by “charge bargaining” at ICTY). 
106 This condition runs into the deep opposition of many international human 
rights lawyers to the death penalty.  But cf. Ohlin, supra note 72, at 748 (explaining 
that opposition by veto-bearing Security Council members France and the United 
Kingdom to the use of the death penalty by the ICTR took the issue off the table). 
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The likely objection to the condition of selectivity is that it runs 
counter to the traditional practice of prosecutors.  Prosecutors 
generally seek to try all potential defendants for all the crimes 
committed.  The desire to prosecute all conceivable crimes may be 
greater with high profile defendants, as prosecutors may wish to 
pursue minor charges in the hope that “something sticks.”107  
While there may be other justifications for pursuing minor 
charges—such as incapacitation—prosecutions of this sort do not 
contribute to norm internalization efforts.  Such trials do not send a 
sufficiently strong message about the international legal 
prohibition on such violations.  Put another way, if it is the 
prohibition on genocide that is in need of internalization, the 
genocidaire’s prosecution for bank fraud sends no message to 
society about genocide.  Worse, it may actually suggest to the 
target audience that when committing genocide, impunity is likely 
so long as you steer away from more easily prosecutable, common 
crimes.108  Similarly, prosecuting the foot soldier, while allowing 
the general to remain free, creates narrative dissonance.  The target 
audience may be tempted to equate the extent of crimes committed 
with the crimes prosecuted, thereby minimizing the tragedy for the 
audience and lessening the likelihood of moral transformation.109 
The third condition for success is accessibility.  Norm 
internalization depends upon the facts developed at trial reaching 
the target audience, as the trial narrative will have no impact if the 
audience does not receive information about the trial.  Past trials 
have failed in this regard because they have used opaque trial 
procedures or anonymously provided evidence, hiding key 
portions of the narrative from the public.110  Prosecutors have also 
 
107 This strategy is often referred to as the “Al Capone” strategy, after the U.S. 
federal government used charges of tax fraud to convict mobster Al Capone.  For 
a general discussion of this strategy, see Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, 
Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 583–84 (2005). 
108 See id. at 586 (“[T]he Capone prosecution sent a much more complicated 
and much less helpful message: If you run a criminal enterprise, you should keep 
your name out of the newspapers and at least pretend to pay your taxes.”). 
109 Selectivity may also run counter to the preferences of victims groups, who 
may prefer to see the prosecution of those individuals who had a hands-on 
involvement in the crimes in question.  See SMITH, supra note 98, at 138–39 
(describing complaints from locals in Sierra Leone that the Special Court has 
failed to prosecute the rank and file militants who directly perpetrated atrocities). 
110 See infra notes 242–47 and accompanying text (describing problems with 
“secret” legal processes). 
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selected evidence for trial that is unlikely to reach the public, 
preferring presentation of dry documentary evidence to the more 
dramatic presentation of victim testimony.  Norm internalization 
has also suffered because the media—the filter between the trials 
and the public—has distorted trial coverage.  Whether due to bias 
or mere sensationalism, distortion undermines the trial narrative’s 
impact on the target audience.111  Increasing accessibility requires 
prioritizing the availability of information to the public.  Such 
prioritization demands trial procedures designed to ensure open 
trials, including limiting the use of classified evidence.  It also 
requires a prosecutorial commitment to select evidence that 
maximizes the impact of a victim’s testimony, which is much more 
likely to have a dramatic effect than standard documentary 
evidence.112  Accessibility also means that the trial authority must 
have a media outreach strategy to reduce the media distortions 
that undermine norm internalization. 
However, making trials for violations of international law 
accessible may prove difficult for at least three reasons.  First, 
information that is critical to the prosecution of war crimes or 
massive human rights tragedies may be classified or otherwise 
sensitive.  As a result, governments may resist the idea that such 
information be made public through open trial.  Second, 
procedures designed to ensure that the defendant receive a fair 
trial may make the trial difficult for press to understand.  For 
example, in international tribunals the adversarial process is 
currently thought to provide the greatest likelihood of a fair trial.  
Such a process may be misinterpreted by the media in civil law 
countries who are not accustomed to the defendant’s robust role in 
the trial.113  Third, trial officials rarely view public relations work as 
part of their job description, preferring to try their cases in courts 
of law, not the in the court of public opinion.  These concerns are 
rooted in both legitimate fears regarding the defendant’s fair trial 
 
111 See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text (discussing the problems in 
media representations of trials). 
112 Israel’s prosecution of Adolf Eichmann successfully magnified the power 
of the trial’s narrative through extensive use of victim testimony, as reflected in 
powerful media accounts of that testimony.  See DOUGLAS, supra note 6, at 104–07 
(explaining that victim testimony was designed to “penetrate the citadel of 
boredom” at trial) (citation omitted). 
113 Cf. Damaška, supra note 6, at 357 (worrying about perceptions of 
equivalency created by trials where the defense and prosecution case are 
presented as rival versions of the truth). 
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rights,114 and less legitimate perceptions that lawyers are above 
public relations work.  But without accessible trials, norm 
internalization is impossible, since the target audience will be 
insufficiently exposed to any kind of morally instructive narrative. 
The fourth condition for success is integration.  No matter how 
coherent a narrative of wrongdoing and punishment is presented 
at trial, trials cannot succeed at norm internalization on their own.  
Past trials have failed to utilize local institutions to deepen and 
reinforce the stories created by trials.115  Integration recognizes that 
trials for violations of international law must be just one part of a 
larger effort at internalizing norms within society in order to 
succeed.  These internal institutions are uniquely capable of taking 
on the advocacy functions necessary socialize new norms.  
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink developed a typology of 
tactics that advocacy groups can use to advance the norms they 
promote.  These include generating and disseminating 
information; identifying and leveraging power sources that can 
affect the needed change; and leading efforts to hold those 
powerful actors accountable for their commitment to the norm in 
question.116  Without the advocacy efforts of these institutions, it is 
hard to imagine the norm in question taking root. 
Prescribing integration is considerably easier than achieving it.  
Ironically, the very reason that trials are promoted as a venue for 
norm internalization—the limited ability of international law to 
influence other institutions in society—also limits the success of the 
trials at the enterprise.  It is unlikely that institutions that 
contributed to the commission of war crimes or massive human 
rights tragedies will immediately reverse course and instead begin 
socializing international legal norms.  Trial authorities should aim 
to use trials to develop and buttress what are likely to be fledgling 
 
114 In the United States, this is rooted in the tension between the press and 
public’s First Amendment right to access trials, and the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial.  See generally Katherine Flanagan-Hyde, The 
Public’s Right of Access to the Military Tribunals and Trials of Enemy Combatants, 48 
ARIZ. L. REV. 585, 604–06 (2006) (describing this tension). 
115 See supra Section 3.1.4. of this Article. 
116 KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 83, at 16.  Keck and Sikkink argue that 
organizations outside the country in question can serve an important advocacy 
function through the indirect “boomerang effect.”  See id., at 13 (arguing that 
international NGOs can influence governments and international institutions that 
can in turn influence a rights-violating government).  Whatever the scope of the 
“boomerage effect,” it is hard to believe such external pressures can succeed in 
altering local beliefs without support from local institutions. 
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local efforts to alter the social acceptability of international law 
violations.  This means empowering, not marginalizing, local legal 
institutions when trials take place outside the community of the 
defendant.  Integration also requires actively using trials to 
influence key opinion makers in society who may in turn push 
local institutions into a supportive posture.  In carrying out such a 
strategy, courts must be careful not to sacrifice the judicial 
independence necessary for a fair trial.  Indeed, care must be taken 
so that the synergies created with local institutions are not a proxy 
for political influence in the trials.  One way to limit this potential 
pitfall is for the trial authority to create a separate entity to handle 
public outreach.  Such an entity could be less concerned about 
appearances of propriety, and instead reach out to relevant 
religious, education, and media figures. 
As a final point, these conditions are developed in the context 
of norm internalization in the community of the defendant.  While 
the past transgressions in the defendant’s community make that a 
natural focus of norm internalization efforts, many of the problems 
described in this Article are unique to a community that has just 
lost a war.  The problem of “victor’s justice,” for example, is far less 
likely to resonate in communities outside of the defendant’s.  
Similarly, media bias against the trials—which skews coverage in 
the defendant’s community—may actually augment the trial’s 
message among less suspicious audiences.117  Thus, while 
application of the four conditions may suggest problems for norm 
internalization in the community of the defendant, it does not 
reflect on the ability of trials to serve alternative messaging 
functions with different audiences.118 
4. ISLAMIC TERRORISM AND NORM INTERNALIZATION 
4.1. The Case for Norm Internalization 
There are at least four reasons why it may be appealing to use 
trials for violations of international law to internalize an anti-
 
117 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text (describing U.S. media bias 
in favor of Nuremberg trials). 
118 Indeed, such trials may serve an indirect salutary effect in the community 
of the defendant.  See Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The 
Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 4 (2001) (arguing that justice events external to a society may create a “justice 
cascade” that promotes human rights and accountability within that society). 
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terrorism norm in the Islamic world.  First, terrorism is a clear 
violation of international law that results in grave human costs; so 
it generates an immense international desire to reduce the 
phenomenon.  While a definition of terrorism under international 
law has proven elusive,119 U.S. law defines the concept as, 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine 
agents.”120  Using this definition, terrorist acts can violate either 
human rights law or international humanitarian law, depending on 
the context.121  A series of international treaties require states to 
criminalize particular forms of terrorist activity, and to then 
prosecute or extradite those found engaged in such activity in their 
territory.  These international treaties are augmented by a series of 
similar regional treaties designed to spur state action against 
terrorists acting within their territory.122  Where states are unable 
or unwilling to prosecute or extradite terrorists operating within 
 
119 Definitions of terrorism have traditionally floundered on the problem of 
distinguishing between legitimate “freedom fighters” and “terrorists.”  For a 
useful discussion on the difficulties the international community has faced in 
defining terrorism, as well as an argument on what the core definition may 
include, see generally Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism 
as a Legal Concept in International Law and its Influence on Definitions in Domestic 
Legislation, 29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 23 (2006). 
120 See 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (defining terrorism for use in annual country 
reports on terrorism; note that this definition excludes attacks on military targets, 
such as al Qaeda’s 2000 attack on the USS Cole). 
121 Terrorism can violate international humanitarian law if the act in question 
occurs during the course of an armed conflict, such as the ongoing war between 
the United States and al Qaeda.  See Hans-Peter Gasser, Acts of Terror, “Terrorism” 
and International Humanitarian Law, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 547, 549 (providing 
detailed support for the illegality of terrorism in armed conflict under IHL).  
Terrorism may also constitute a crime against humanity when committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.  See Vincent-
Joël Proulx, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in the Post-
September 11th Era: Should Acts of Terrorism Qualify as Crimes Against Humanity?, 19 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1009, 1029 (2004) (arguing that terrorism meets the Rome 
Statute definition of crime against humanity).  Finally, terrorism can be a violation 
of human rights, at least when perpetrated by governments against its own 
people, and maybe more broadly.  See Karima Bennoune, Terror/Torture, 26 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 41–44 (2008) (marshaling evidence to argue that terrorism 
committed by non-state actors also amounts to a human rights violation). 
122 For a comprehensive discussion of international and regional treaties 
against terrorism, including the activities covered and the scope of the extradition 
or prosecution regime, see Daniel O’Donnell, International Treaties Against 
Terrorism and the Use of Terrorism During Armed Conflict and by Armed Forces, 88 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 853 (2006). 
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their territory, the 1998 Rome Statute grants the International 
Criminal Court jurisdiction in certain cases.123 
In addition to the clear prohibition on terrorism in international 
law, terrorist acts inflict a significant human cost.  Nowhere are 
these costs felt greater than in the Islamic world, where the 
majority of today’s terrorists and their victims are Muslim.  The 
U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (“NCTC”) 2008 Report on 
Terrorism found that 55% of the 11,800 terrorist attacks committed 
in 2008 took place in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.  Islamic 
extremist groups such as the Taliban, al Qaeda, and al Qaeda-
affiliated groups like the Somali Shabaab claimed responsibility for 
the largest number of attacks.124  Over 50,000 people worldwide 
were injured or killed due to terrorism in 2008, and “well over 
50%” of those were Muslim.125  Added to this great human cost is 
the tremendous financial cost terrorism imposes on society, both in 
terms of direct costs from property damage and destroyed 
infrastructure and indirect costs to consumer and investor 
confidence.126 
Second, lasting deterrence of terrorism is hard to achieve.  For 
groups like al Qaeda, the motivation for acts of terrorism is not 
malice per se, but rather a distorted sense of saving the world from 
a present danger for future good.127  If a terrorist is willing to die 
for the good he believes he is achieving, it seems unlikely that the 
threat of life in prison—or even the death—will serve as a 
meaningful restraint on behavior.128  Even more rational actors, 
such as some state sponsors of terrorism, can be difficult to deter.  
 
123 See Rome Statute, supra note 46, art. 7(1), 8(1), 8(2)(b)(i)–(ii), (iv) (granting 
ICC jurisdiction to consider corresponding crimes against humanity and 
international humanitarian law violations).  The effort by some states to include 
terrorism as a crime against humanity was rejected at the Rome Conference, due 
in large part to opposition by the United States.  Proulx, supra note 121, at 1023. 
124 NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, 2008 REPORT ON TERRORISM 11 (Apr. 
30, 2009) available at http://wits.nctc.gov/ReportPDF.do?f=crt2008nctcannexfinal 
.pdf. 
125 Id. at 12. 
126 See R. Barry Johnston & Oana M. Nedelescu, The Impact of Terrorism on 
Financial Markets 3–4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 60, 2005). 
127 Cf. Koskenniemi, supra note 14, at 8 (referring to Nazi and Soviet evils as 
non-deterrable because they were perpetrated in an effort to do social good). 
128 See Damaška, supra note 6, at 344 (“[I]t is not clear how deterrence could 
work against people who regard death in pursuit of their actions as vindication 
and beatification.”); see also Drumbl, supra note 5, at 1185–86 (arguing that 
terrorists do not use a “rational actor cost-benefit analysis” required for successful 
deterrence). 
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Those engaged in terrorist activity should be cognizant of the poor 
record of international law in apprehending, convicting and 
punishing terrorists.  There have been many examples within the 
Islamic world of states that fail to arrest or prosecute known 
terrorists within their territory,129 sentence those caught and 
convicted to very short sentences,130 or just outright release 
terrorists—allowing them to freely return to their prior activities.131  
Efforts in the West to prosecute terrorists have been similarly 
stymied by evidentiary problems, resulting in acquittals or 
reversed convictions.132  Despite these problems, there has been no 
real effort to use the ICC’s jurisdiction over attacks on civilians to 
prosecute terrorists whom states are unable or unwilling to 
prosecute.  Moreover, while the West has promised various 
benefits to states that renounce terrorism, it has been inconsistent 
in delivering on these incentives, creating the risk of recidivism.133 
Third, there is evidence to suggest the anti-terrorism norm has 
failed to adequately permeate Islamic societies.  As a consequence, 
terrorism remains a socially acceptable method for achieving 
political aims in significant parts of the Islamic world.  At times 
over the last several years, a majority of people in Lebanon, Jordan, 
 
129 For example, Kuwait refused to prosecute three former Guantanamo 
detainees suspected of involvement in terrorism after their return; one 
subsequently traveled to Iraq and committed a suicide bombing in Mosul.  Alissa 
J. Rubin, Former Guantánamo Detainee Tied to Mosul Suicide Attack, N.Y. TIMES, May 
8, 2008, at A8. 
130 For example, Indonesia sentenced Abu Bakar Bashir, inspirational leader 
of the terror group Jemaah Islamiyah, to just thirty months in prison for his 
involvement in the conspiracy that led to the 2002 bombing of a nightclub in Bali, 
and then cut four and a half more months off the sentence in honor of Indonesia’s 
Independence Day.  Evelyn Rusli, Bali Bomb Sentences Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 
2005, at A12. 
131 Yemen released Jamal al-Badawi, architect of the 2000 attack on the USS 
Cole, in October 2007 in return for help in tracking down Islamic radicals who had 
escaped from prison.  He was re-arrested by the Yemenis after the U.S. threatened 
to cut off counter-terrorism aid over the release.  Robert F. Worth, Yemen’s Deals 
with Jihadists Unsettle the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2008, at A1. 
132 German courts acquitted Abdelghani Mzoudi, a Moroccan national and 
Mohammed Atta’s Hamburg roommate, for his involvement in the 9/11 attacks 
because U.S. officials refused to allow Ramzi bin al-Shibh, then in CIA custody, to 
testify at trial.  See Desmond Butler, Faulting U.S., Germany Frees a 9/11 Suspect, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at A1 (quoting the judge stating: “You are acquitted not 
because the court is convinced of your innocence, but because the evidence was 
not enough to convict you.”). 
133 See Slackman, supra note 28 (discussing Libyan complaints on American 
follow-through after it gave up terrorism in return for political and economic 
benefits). 
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and Egypt believed that suicide bombing of civilian targets could 
in some instances be justified in defense of Islam, and significant 
percentages of people in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Indonesia 
agreed.134  While there have been some positive signs regarding 
attitudes towards al Qaeda and terrorism in the Islamic world in 
the last two years,135 year to year fluctuations in poll numbers do 
not demonstrate a deep rooted abhorrence of terrorism as a means 
to a political end.  Indeed, there was a slight increase in support for 
suicide bombings in Jordan and Indonesia last year, and over a 
quarter of the population in Nigeria, Jordan, and Lebanon 
continues to support such tactics.136 
Thomas Friedman, a columnist for the New York Times, has 
argued that the failure of ordinary Muslims to condemn terrorism 
has done more to perpetuate its use by extremists than any other 
factor.137  This passivity, he believes, is at least partially motivated 
by a belief that it is legitimate to kill civilians of different faiths, 
ostensibly in defense of your own religion.138  Friedman believes 
that the best weapon against terrorism is a response from the 
terrorist’s community saying, “‘No more. What you have done in 
murdering defenseless men, women and children has brought 
shame on us and on you.’”139  A broadly accepted anti-terrorism 
norm may go a long way towards creating the social condemnation 
 
134 PEW GLOBAL PROJECT ATTITUDES, THE GREAT DIVIDE: HOW WESTERNERS AND 
MUSLIMS VIEW EACH OTHER 4 (2006) available at http://pewglobal.org 
/reports/pdf/253.pdf.  In 2006, 35% of French Muslims believed that violence 
against civilian targets could at least rarely be justified by defense of Islam.  Id. 
135 Support for suicide bombing has dropped since 2006, most notably in 
Pakistan, where it fell from 33% in 2002 to 5% in 2008.  THE PEW GLOBAL PROJECT 
ATTITUDES, GLOBAL PUBLIC OPINION IN THE BUSH YEARS (2001-2008) 7 (Dec. 18, 2008) 
available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/263.pdf.  Confidence in al Qaeda 
as an organization and Osama bin Laden as a leader is also slumping; confidence 
dropped among Jordanian Muslims from 56% in 2003 to 19% in 2008.  Id.  In 2008, 
only 3% of Muslims in Turkey, and 2% of Muslims in Lebanon expressed 
confidence in Bin Laden.  Id. 
136 Id. 
137 See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Op.-Ed., Calling all Pakistanis, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 3, 2008, at A31 (arguing that terrorism will only stop when the home society 
of the terrorists condemns it). 
138 Thomas L. Friedman, Op.-Ed., Sunni Arabs May Ask “Why Us?” They 
Should Ask, ‘Why Anyone?’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at A23 (describing the lack 
of protest when Christian, Jews, Hindus, and even Shiites are murdered). 
139 Friedman, supra note 137. 
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of terrorism Friedman believes is necessary to combat the 
phenomenon.140 
Fourth, international law wields limited influence over other 
social institutions in the Islamic world that are central to norm 
development.  The international legal prohibition on terrorism has 
only weakly influenced schools, religious institutions, and the 
media in the Islamic world.  As a result, these institutions have 
made only halting efforts to combat militancy.  Religious schools 
have taken the place of secular government-run schools in parts of 
places like Pakistan and have bred Islamic militancy where it did 
not previously exist.  Pakistani police say that more than two-
thirds of the suicide bombers that have struck in Punjab province 
were educated through these madrasas.141  Radical clerics have 
been the inspirational backbone of Islamic terrorists.  For example, 
Abu Qatada, a radical Palestinian cleric linked to the Finsbury Park 
mosque in London, has been accused of inspiring shoe bomber 
Richard Reid and 9/11 conspirator Zacharias Moussaoui.142  While 
many Islamic clerics have spoken out forcefully against terrorism, 
their message is frequently drowned out by more radical voices—
often in violent ways.143  The media has not been helpful either.  
Children’s television shows use puppet characters like Assud the 
Rabbit to glorify martyrdom as part of the Palestinian struggle 
against Israel.144  Given international law’s limited influence over 
critical institutions in the Islamic world, trials for violations of 
international law are a potential rare vehicle for influencing norm 
development. 
 
140 See Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, 
Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 
85 (2002) (arguing that “the creation of a legal and social norm that condemns 
terrorism is a necessary mid- to long-term project”). 
141 Sabrina Tavernise, Pakistan’s Islamic Schools Fill Void, but Fuel Militancy, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2009, at A1. 
142 Alan Cowell, Fugitive Muslim Cleric, an Outspoken Supporter of Al Qaeda, Is 
Arrested in London, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2002, at A9. 
143 See Waqar Gillani & Sabrina Tavernise, Moderate Cleric Among 9 Killed in 
Pakistan Blasts, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2009, at A10 (describing Taliban murders of 
moderate Pakistani clerics). 
144 Steven Erlanger, In Gaza, Hamas’s Insults To Jews Complicate Peace Effort, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2008, at A1.  Assud tells the kids, “We are all martyrdom-
seekers, are we not . . . ?  . . .  We are all ready to sacrifice ourselves for the sake of 
our homeland.”  Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss2/3
 
2009] NORM INTERNALIZATION 465 
4.2. History of Trials at Guantanamo Bay 
Given the four factors above, it is not surprising that some 
scholars have looked to trials of terror suspects detained at 
Guantanamo Bay as a potential locus for norm internalization 
efforts in the Islamic world.145  Before analyzing whether these 
trials could meet the four conditions laid out in Section 2, this 
Section provides a brief account of the efforts of the U.S. 
government to date in trying those detained at Guantanamo for 
violations of international law. 
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order 
authorizing the Secretary of Defense to set up military 
commissions.146  The Military Order potentially subjected all aliens 
to trial by military commission, including resident aliens, but 
excluded American citizens from the commission’s jurisdiction.147  
The Department of Defense implementation order specified that 
detainees would be tried by military commission for “violations of 
the laws of war and all other offenses triable by military 
commission”148 but did not define specific offenses.  The initial 
iteration of commissions was criticized for departing significantly 
from the procedural protections traditionally provided to 
defendants in U.S. federal courts or in UCMJ courts martial.  The 
commissions did not include any evidentiary protections from the 
use of hearsay evidence or evidence obtained through coercive 
means short of torture;149 allowed for admission of secret classified 
evidence never seen by the defendant, provided it did not result in 
“deni[al] of a full and fair trial”;150 permitted the Secretary of 
 
145 See supra Section 2. 
146 Military Order—Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens 
in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter 
Military Order]. 
147 Id. § 2(a). 
148 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSIONS ORDER NO. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002), 
§ 3(b), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002 
/d20020321ord.pdf [hereinafter MCO 1]. 
149 See id. § 6D(1) (allowing admission of evidence that “would have 
probative value to a reasonable person”).  MCO1 did not initially restrict evidence 
obtained through the use of torture, but a restriction was added shortly before 
oral arguments in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.  See also Jess Bravin, White House Will 
Reverse Policy, Ban Evidence Elicited by Torture, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2006, at A3 
(describing Defense Department regulation that had been approved but not 
publicly released). 
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Defense to make changes to the rules mid-trial;151 and provided 
judicial review of convictions as a right only where the defendant 
was sentenced to death or a term of imprisonment greater than ten 
years, making review of shorter sentences a discretionary decision 
of the D.C. Circuit.152  Ten detainees were referred for prosecution 
under the initial commissions system, although no detainee was 
charged with involvement in high profile terrorist activity.153  This 
reflected a deliberate strategy by the Bush Administration to use 
the initial trials at Guantanamo as a “shake-down cruise for the 
new procedures” before trying higher-level suspects.154 
The first iteration of commissions came to a close with the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,155 which found that 
the President’s military commissions violated Congressional 
mandate.156  The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”)157 
 
150 U.S. Dep’t of Defense, News Release, Secretary Rumsfeld Approves 
Changes to Improve Military Commission Procedures (Aug. 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8837.  This was a 
modification of earlier procedures that had no full and fair trial requirement.  
MCO1 § 6D(5)(b). 
151 See MCO1 § 11 (permitting Secretary of Defense to amend commission 
rules “from time to time”). 
152 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(3)(B)(i)–(ii).  Review would consist of whether the 
standards and procedures in MCO1 were followed, as well as whether the use of 
those standards and procedures to arrive at a final decision was consistent with 
the laws and constitution of the United States, to the extent applicable.  Id. § 
2241(e)(3)(D).  This right created in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 was a 
significant modification of the original commissions system envisioned by the 
President, which included no judicial review at all.  MCO1 § 6H(4)–(6). 
153 The ten detainees charged were Ali Hamza al-Bahlul (Yemen); Ibrahim al-
Qosi (Sudan); David Hicks (Australia); Salim Ahmed Hamdan (Yemen); Omar 
Khadr (Canada); Ghassan al-Sharbi (Saudi Arabia); Jabran Qahtani (Saudi 
Arabia); Sufyian Barhoumi (Algeria); Binyam Muhammad (Ethiopia); and Abdul 
Zahir (Afghanistan), most of whom were charged only with conspiracy based on 
their involvement with al Qaeda and the Taliban.  David Hicks and Omar Khadr 
were also charged with murder and aiding the enemy based on their involvement 
in firefights between the Taliban and the U.S. military in the course of the war in 
Afghanistan.  Only Abdul Zahir was charged with directly attacking civilians.  
U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Military Commissions, http://www.defenselink.mil/news 
/Nov2004/charge_sheets.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2009). 
154 See Neil A. Lewis, Six Detainees May Soon Face Military Trials, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 4, 2003, at A1 (quoting Bush Administration officials). 
155 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
156 The Court found that military commissions violated the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (“UCMJ”) in two ways.  First, commissions violated Article 36(b) 
of the UCMJ by deviating significantly from court-martial rules with respect to 
admissibility of evidence, including hearsay and coerced evidence, as well as the 
right of the defendant to see all the evidence against him presented at trial.  Id. at 
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revived military commissions after Hamdan.  Unlike the earlier 
iteration of commissions, the MCA opted to legislatively define the 
offenses within the jurisdiction of the commissions.  Congress 
indicated its intent not to define any new offenses in the MCA, but 
rather to limit the jurisdiction of the commissions only to “offenses 
that have traditionally been triable by military commission.”158  
While one may assume that these offenses would have been those 
recognized as customary under IHL,159 in fact the definition of 
murder,160 conspiracy161 and material support for terrorism162 
exceeded the scope of traditional law of war offenses. 
The MCA also modified the controversial evidentiary rules 
from the initial iteration of commissions, increasing protection for 
defendants but still providing fewer procedural rights than are 
afforded defendants in courts-martial or U.S. federal courts.  The 
MCA specifically barred statements obtained through torture as 
well as those obtained in violation of the DTA’s prohibition on 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.163  But the MCA was 
careful to distinguish between evidence obtained before and after 
the enactment of the DTA.  The MCA allows admission of evidence 
obtained through coercion short of torture—including cruel, 
 
623–25.  Second, commissions violated Article 21’s requirement of compliance 
with the “law of war,” by failing to meet the requirements of Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions.  Id. at 632–33, n.65. 
157 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter MCA] . 
158 Id. § 950p(a). 
159 But see John C. Dehn, The Hamdan Case and the Application of a Municipal 
Offense, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 63, 81 (2009) (arguing that MCA codified a U.S. 
common law offense of “murder in violation of the law of war” even though that 
offense is not an IHL war crime, but rather a municipal offense “permitted” by 
IHL). 
160 Unlawful or unprivileged combatants, defined as combatants without 
combatant immunity, can be prosecuted under existing and applicable municipal 
law for their actions in combat precisely because they lack immunity.  They may 
also be prosecuted under international humanitarian law but only for violations of 
the laws of war, such as attacks targeting civilians.  Knut Dormann, The Legal 
Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants”, 85 I.R.R.C. 45, 70–71.  Only a small 
number of those slated for prosecution were charged with murdering civilians. 
161 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 601 (Stevens, J., plurality) (concluding that 
conspiracy is not an “[o]ffence[] against the Law of Nations”). 
162 See Jack M. Beard, The Geneva Boomerang: The Military Commissions Act of 
2006 and U.S. Counterterror Operations, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 56, 60–61 (2007) (arguing 
that MCA offense of providing material support for terrorism extends beyond 
traditional law of war offenses). 
163 MCA § 948r(a), (d)(3). 
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inhuman and degrading treatment—which was collected before 
the DTA was enacted, provided the statement was reliable and 
probative, and admission best served the interests of justice.164  
Hearsay evidence remained admissible, but the defendant was 
given a greater opportunity to get hearsay excluded if he could 
demonstrate that the evidence was unreliable.165  As for classified 
evidence, the MCA took the important step of recognizing the right 
of the defendant to be present, absent courtroom disruptions,166 
and guaranteed the defendant the right to receive all relevant 
exculpatory evidence or an unclassified substitute.167  It did, 
however, allow the government to admit evidence without 
revealing the sources and methods behind the evidence, where the 
military judge determined the sources and methods were classified 
and the evidence was reliable.168  Finally, the MCA included a 
catchall provision requiring the military judge to exclude evidence 
whose prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative 
value.169 
Finally, the MCA built on the judicial review process created in 
the Detainee Treatment Act.  It created a Court of Military 
Commission Review, consisting of panels of at least three appellate 
military judges, to hear appeals of legal questions stemming from 
final military commission orders.170  The MCA also maintained the 
role of the D.C. Circuit in reviewing final military commission 
orders but extended the right of appeal to all convicted by a 
commission.  The scope of review from the DTA was essentially 
maintained, as the D.C. Circuit was granted the right to review 
whether commission proceedings abided by the regulations within 
the MCA, as well as whether those regulations were consistent 
with the laws and Constitution of the United States, to the extent 
applicable.171 
Only three MCA commissions—all of minor al Qaeda figures—
were completed before President Obama temporarily suspended 
 
164 Id. § 948r(c). 
165 See id. § 949a(b)(2)(E) (requiring government provide defendant notice of 
intention to use hearsay and particulars of the evidence). 
166 Id. § 949d(a)(2). 
167 Id. § 949j(d). 
168 Id. § 949d(f)(2)(B). 
169 Id. § 949a(b)(2)(F). 
170 Id. § 950f. 
171 Id. § 950g. 
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commissions upon taking office.172  Australian David Hicks pled 
guilty to providing material support for terrorism for training at 
the al-Farooq training camp in Kandahar, where he allegedly 
learned kidnapping techniques and urban fighting skills.  He 
received a nine month sentence, which he was allowed to serve in 
Australia, amid allegations that the plea bargain was motivated by 
political pressure from Australia.173  Yemeni Salim Hamdan was 
convicted of providing material support for terrorism for his work 
as Osama bin Laden’s bodyguard and driver, and was sentenced to 
just five additional months of imprisonment.174 
Hamdan’s trial was marred by allegations of abuse175 and 
extensive use of classified evidence not available to the public.176  
Ali Hamza al-Bahlul, an al Qaeda propaganda chief, was convicted 
of material support for terrorism, solicitation to commit murder , 
and conspiracy after he refused to participate or allow his lawyers 
to participate in his trial.177  Meanwhile, charges against six 
defendants for conspiring to commit the 9/11 attacks,178 against 
 
172 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
173 See Raymond Bonner, Critics Say Australian Leader Was Alert to Politics in 
Detainee Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2007, at A26 (quoting Green Party leader Bob 
Brown describing Hicks’ deal as “more about saving Mr. Howard’s political hide 
than about justice for Hicks”); see also Jess Bravin, Political Sway at Guantanamo? 
Former Prosecutor Says Pressure Began with Australian’s Case, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 
2007, at A4 (noting Morris Davis’ account that Hicks’ charges were rushed based 
on political pressure from Australia). 
174 William Glaberson, Panel Sentences Bin Laden Driver to a Short Term, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, at A1. 
175 The military judge excluded statements made by Hamdan to interrogators 
in Afghanistan, prior to being sent to Guantanamo, because those statements were 
made at a time when he was in solitary confinement, with restrained hands and 
feet, and subjected to aggressive interrogation tactics by guards.  See William 
Glaberson & Eric Lichtblau, Guantanamo Detainee’s Trial Opens, Ending a Seven-Year 
Legal Tangle, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2008, at A12 .  Hamdan also claimed he was part 
of Operation Sandman at Guantanamo, a program in which the Defense 
Department subjected detainees to intense sleep deprivation to soften them for 
interrogation. William Glaberson, Detainee’s Lawyers Make Claim on Sleep 
Deprivation, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2008, at A15. 
176 See William Glaberson, Prosecution Rests, Then Terror Trial Enters Secret 
Session to Hear Defense Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008, at A13 (noting that 
even a portion of the defense’s case resting on the 9/11 Commission Report was 
deemed classified). 
177 William Glaberson, Detainee Convicted on Terrorism Charges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2008, at A19 (describing Ali Hamza al Bahlul’s conviction). 
178 See William Glaberson, Hurdles Seen as Capital Charges Are Filed in 9/11 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at A14 (describing charges against Khalid Shaikh 
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another detainee for involvement with the bombing of the U.S. 
embassy in Tanzania,179 and against another for masterminding the 
2000 attack on the USS Cole,180 were suspended because of 
problems created by complicated evidence, limited defense 
resources, translation problems,181 and torture.182 
One of President Obama’s first actions after taking office as 
President of the United States was to suspend military 
commissions.183  In May the President laid out in broad terms his 
vision for future trials of those detained at Guantanamo.184  Obama 
indicated his preference for conducting trials in the U.S. federal 
courts “whenever feasible” for violations of U.S. criminal law.  By 
contrast, he advocated for use of revamped military commissions, 
with greater procedural protections for defendants for those 
persons believed to have committed violations of the laws of war.  
To implement these goals, President Obama signed the Military 
Commissions Act of 2009 (“MCA09”) into law in October 2009.185  
MCA09 expanded numerous procedural protections for 
defendants, including:  implementing a ban on statements 
 
Mohammed, Mohammed al-Qahtani, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali, 
Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, and Walid bin Attash). 
179 See William Glaberson, Guantánamo Detainee, Indicted in ‘98, Now Faces War 
Crimes Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2008, at A16 (describing charges against 
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani for coordinating and planning the attack). Ghailani has 
now been transferred to the Southern District of New York for trial.  See Benjamin 
Weiser, Guantanamo Detainee Pleads Not Guilty in a Manhattan Court, N.Y. TIMES,  
June 10, 2009, at A25 (describing Ghailani’s trial process). 
180 See William Glaberson, Guantánamo Detainee Faces War Crimes Charges in 
Attack on Destroyer, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2008, at A15 (describing charges against 
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri). 
181 William Glaberson, New Roadblocks Delay Tribunals at Guantánamo, 
Frustrating the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2008, at A16 (describing problems 
with Guantanamo detainees’ trials, including translation difficulties). 
182 Charges against Mohammed al-Qahtani, an alleged 9/11 co-conspirator, 
were dropped after Susan Crawford, the convening authority of military 
commissions, determined that al-Qahtani had been tortured by the Defense 
Department through “sustained isolation, sleep deprivation, nudity, and 
prolonged exposure to cold.”  Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at A1. 
183 See Exec. Order No. 13,492 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (ordering the closure of the 
detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay). 
184 See Obama Address, supra note 1 (describing President Obama’s plans for 
trials for Guantanamo detainees). 
185 Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 
(codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) [hereinafter “MCA09”]. 
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obtained through cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment;186 
imposing an obligation on the government to provide exculpatory 
evidence to the defense similar to the Brady rule in civilian 
courts;187 restricting the use of hearsay;188 and developing classified 
information rules to closely match those found in the Classified 
Information Protection Act (“CIPA”).189  The Administration is 
currently proceeding with trials against those believed to be 
involved in 9/11 and African Embassy bombings in federal court, 
while restarting military commissions for those involved in the 
USS Cole attack, among others.190 
4.3. Guantanamo Trials and the Four Conditions 
In some ways, the trials of the detainee population at 
Guantanamo Bay present excellent opportunities for promoting an 
anti-terrorism norm in the Islamic world.191  Many high-level 
members of al Qaeda and affiliated groups are or have been 
detained there, including those believed to have been behind 9/11, 
the attack on the U.S. embassy in Tanzania, the Bali nightclub 
bombing, and other major terrorist attacks.  Norm internalization 
theory argues that trials that develop a legitimate history of these 
events, and produce a graphic account of the facts and the role of 
Islamic terrorists in the attacks, can strengthen opposition to these 
acts in the Islamic world.192  Demonstration of the human costs of 
violating international law may be the most powerful argument in 
favor of following it.  Trials of these detainees also can stigmatize 
the offenders and offenses through imposition of serious sentences, 
 
186 Id. § 948r(a) 
187 Id. § 949j. 
188 Id. § 949a. 
189 Id. § 949p-4. 
190 Savage, supra note 4, at A18. 
191 Of course there are many other reasons for conducting prosecutions of 
detainees at Guantanamo, including retribution for terrorist acts that killed many 
Americans.  See Jeff Zeleny & Elisabeth Bumiller, Suspects Will Face Justice, Obama 
Tells Families of Terrorism Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, at A11 (describing 
pressure from some victims’ families to bring of Guantanamo detainees to trial). 
192 Polling suggests there is a great deal of misinformation in the Islamic 
world about 9/11.  For example, a 2006 study found that a majority of people in 
Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, and a plurality in Pakistan and Nigeria, do 
not believe that Arabs were behind the 9/11 attacks.  PEW GLOBAL PROJECT 
ATTITUDES, supra note 134, at 4.  That view was shared by 56% of British Muslims.  
Id. 
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including the death penalty, thus deepening revulsion towards 
terrorism in the defendant’s community. 
Nevertheless, the Bush Administration never claimed an intent 
to use trials to advance pedagogical goals among Muslim 
audiences.193  The primary purpose for Guantanamo was 
incapacitation and interrogation of terrorist suspects, and military 
commissions were an extension of those objectives.  Not 
surprisingly, the trials that have taken place so far do not appear to 
have been successful at promoting an anti-terrorism norm in the 
Islamic world.  While measurement of the effect of trials on norm 
internalization is a long-term project, the reaction of opinion 
leaders in the Islamic world to commissions suggests, at minimum, 
current resistance to the messages produced by these trials.  The 
weekly Egyptian news magazine Al-Ahram compared the first 
iteration of military commissions to political trials in China, and 
declared the trials “’victor’s justice’ in the era of a one-superpower 
world.”194  The Arab News, an English-language newspaper 
published in Saudi Arabia, discounted the possibility that David 
Hicks’ guilty plea was honest, instead noting that “[m]any believe 
him entirely innocent,”195 and discussed the theory that Hicks 
pleaded guilty because of his desire to escape Guantanamo.196  The 
same newspaper dismissed the significance of the announcement 
of charges against the 9/11 conspirators by arguing that the 
“confessions” upon which these charges were based were likely 
elicited by torture.197  The Lebanese newspaper the Daily Star 
published an opinion piece crediting the relatively implausible 
 
193 Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, however, did state in general 
terms, “it is important that the public have the chance to see both the fairness of 
the commission proceedings, and the evidence against the terrorists in our 
custody.” Alberto Gonzales, Ask the White House (Oct. 18, 2006), 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ask/20061018.html.  This 
statement was meant to address concerns raised by American critics of 
commissions, not as a statement of intent to use trials to influence norms in the 
Islamic world. 
194 Nyier Abdou, Fire and Brimstone, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY (Egypt), July 10–16, 
2003, available at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/646/in8.htm. 
195 Editorial, Victory for Bigotry, ARAB NEWS (Saudi Arabia), Apr. 1, 2007, 
available at http://www.arabnews.com/?article=94448. 
196 Id. 
197 See Editorial, Flawed Trial, ARAB NEWS (Saudi Arabia), Feb. 13, 2008, 
available at http://www.arabnews.com/?article=106719 (“Most . . . people would 
confess to anything their torturers wanted to hear in order to save their lives and 
escape further horrific treatment.”). 
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accounts of two Kuwaiti detainees whom the Bush Administration 
referred charges against in November 2008.198  This generally 
negative reaction to commissions suggests that their impact on 
attitudes in the Islamic world is limited, or even affirmatively 
negative, at least as a contemporary matter. 
Moving forward, many alternative venues exist for trials of 
Guantanamo detainees, all of which allude to norm internalization 
as a potential reform gain.  The Obama Administration supports 
trials in the U.S. federal courts and in revamped military 
commissions, which provide greater procedural protections for 
defendants.  While the primary reason behind providing these 
added protections is increasing the number of completed trials,199 
increased international legitimacy appears to be, at least, a 
secondary goal.200 
Another alternative is trying detainees in their home countries 
where, some have argued, trials have the greatest opportunity to 
influence norm development.201  Application of the four conditions 
suggests why these types of trials may be more effective.  Fair trials 
conducted by the defendant’s own community may more easily 
meet the consistency threshold because they are less susceptible to 
being diminished as “victor’s justice.”  Local forums may also be 
best positioned to be selective, as the community of perpetrators of 
mass human rights atrocities may have the best access to the most 
culpable defendants, and hence the greatest opportunity to 
 
198 See Andy Worthington, More Funny Business at Guantanamo, DAILY STAR 
(Lebanon), Nov. 21, 2008, available at http://www.andyworthington.co.uk 
/2008/11/21/more-dubious-charges-in-the-guantanamo-trials/ (last visited Nov. 
17, 2009) (“[T]heir cases do nothing to suggest that the [Bush] Administration has 
correctly identified them as terrorists worthy of war crimes trials.”). 
199 See Obama Address, supra note 1 (contrasting his approach to trials to a 
Bush approach that completed just 3 trials). 
200 See Savage, supra note 4, at A18 (quoting Attorney General Holder that 
one of purposes at trial will be “the nation and the world will see [Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed] for the coward that he is”); see also SARAH MENDELSON, CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., CLOSING GUANTÁNAMO: FROM BUMPER STICKER TO 
BLUEPRINT 15 (2008) (arguing that one advantage of using existing institutions to 
try Guantanamo detainees is increased legitimacy in the international 
community); Harold H. Koh, The Case against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L. 
L. 337, 342–43 (2002) (“To ensure that the international community perceives that 
those convicted for the September 11 attacks will receive fair and impartial justice, 
the United States should send suspects only to standing tribunals that have 
demonstrated their capacity to dispense such justice in the past.”). 
201 See Alvarez, supra note 72, at 459–60 (arguing that local trials have greater 
opportunity to stigmatize those violating international norms because they enjoy 
the greatest legitimacy in their community). 
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prosecute the most serious crimes under international law.202  In so 
doing, they are more likely to have access to the most severe 
sanction, the death penalty, which has been cast out of most 
international legal proceedings.203  The trials conducted in the 
community of the defendant will also be the most accessible to that 
community, as they can be viewed directly by the relevant public 
and are likely to be the subject of more extensive media 
coverage.204  Local media, more comfortable with local processes, 
prosecutors and judges, may be less inclined to obscure or distort 
trial coverage.  And local courts will be the best positioned to 
integrate their efforts with the other institutions in society 
necessary to amplify trial messaging.205 
Still others have pressed for use of an international forum to 
prosecute Guantanamo detainees, be it an ad hoc institution 
created for the purpose of hearing terrorism cases206 or, where 
possible, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).207  One variant 
of these proposals is to include Islamic jurists and elements of 
Shariah law in a tribunal.208  Incorporation of Shariah law and 
 
202 Radovan Karadzic may have been tried far earlier for his alleged 
genocidal acts in Bosnia had the Serbian government not had to face the unsavory 
prospect of his trial by a foreign court.  See Dan Bilefsky, Karadzic Arrest Is Big Step 
for a Land Tired of Being Europe’s Pariah, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2008, at A10 
(describing traditional Serb resistance to an international trial of one of its 
nationals). 
203 See Alvarez, supra note 72, at 406–07 (noting inconsistency where ICTR 
does not permit use of the death penalty for those most culpable of genocide, 
while Rwandan courts do impose death sentences for those more tangentially 
involved). 
204 See id. at 403–04 (detailing accessibility benefits of local trials). 
205 See NEWTON & SCHARF, supra note 15, at 211 (describing the belief that 
trials conducted by German courts after World War II of lower-ranking Nazi 
officials have been more influential on reshaping German morality than the IMT). 
206 See Drumbl, supra note 5, at 1195–96 (arguing that “the value of rhetorical 
consistency” and “the transnational nature of terrorist violence” should lead to 
consideration of an international tribunal to try al Qaeda members); Anton L. 
Janik, Jr., Prosecuting al Qaeda: America’s Human Rights Policy Interests Are Best 
Served By Trying Terrorists Under International Tribunals, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
498, 531 (2002) (arguing that the preservation of “moral high ground” requires 
moving trials to an international forum); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Op-Ed., Terrorism 
and Justice, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 12, 2001, at 23 (supporting use of an ad hoc 
tribunal composed of U.S. and Islamic judges). 
207 See Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role of the 
International Criminal Court as a Legal Response to Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
13, 21–24 (2003) (advocating for use of the ICC to try terrorism crimes). 
208 Slaughter, supra note 206 (extolling the virtues of participation by Islamic 
jurists in an international tribunal).  See also Drumbl, supra note 140, at 79 (arguing 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss2/3
 
2009] NORM INTERNALIZATION 475 
judges familiar with Shariah law into an international tribunal may 
increase the likelihood that such trials make a didactic impact in 
the Islamic world.209  To the extent that the target audience accepts 
Shariah law as a legitimate source of behavioral regulation, a 
judgment that terrorism violates Islamic teachings would have the 
greatest potential to inculcate an anti-terrorism norm.210 
This section uses the four conditions developed in Section 2 to 
analyze the failures of the Bush Administration’s commissions 
with respect to norm internalization in the Islamic world.  It then 
analyzes whether the Obama approach, or any alternative 
proposed approach could meet the four conditions.  The objective 
here is to understand the difficult challenges any set of trials of 
those detained at Guantanamo will face in internalizing an anti-
terrorism norm. 
4.3.1. Consistency 
Consistent application of international law by the trial 
authority is necessary to dispel the corrosive impression that 
prosecution is motivated more by a desire to continue a recently 
completed war than to vindicate international law.  Past 
international war crimes trials have been dismissed as victor’s 
justice by the community of the defendant when the trial authority 
has used procedures that do not comport with international law.  
Such trials appear to apply the law selectively.  Inconsistency in 
application of international law has also been demonstrated where 
the trial authority prosecutes the crimes of just one side to a 
 
that trials of the Taliban and Afghan terrorists should “involve Islamic jurists, 
judges, and prosecutors, and take place in mixed forum situated in Islamic 
countries”). 
209 Indeed, 66% of Egyptians, 60% of Pakistanis, and 54% of Jordanians 
support using Shariah as the only form of law in their country.  See Noah 
Feldman, Why Shariah?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, (Magazine) at 47 (describing the 
support for the use of Shariah law). 
210 Islamic countries have used condemnations of terrorism by moderate 
Islamic clerics as a central tool in “de-radicalizing” Islamic militants.  See Shefali 
Rekhi, Spiritual Rehab for Terrorists, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Mar. 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.asianewsnet.net/news.php?id=4393 (describing the role of clerics in 
instruction on moderate Islam in rehabilitation programs in Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen).  But see Jack Goldsmith & Bernard Meltzer, Op.-Ed., Swift Justice for Bin 
Laden, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 7, 2001, at 15, available at http://specials.ft.com 
/theresponse/FT39N0I3QTC.html (arguing that even an international tribunal 
with a Muslim judge would be viewed by some Muslims as “a biased tool of 
Western power”). 
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conflict, reinforcing the sense that trials have little to do with 
accurate fact finding and norm implementation. 
The Bush Administration’s military commissions displayed 
both of these problems.  To begin with, military commissions, 
while prosecuting defendants for their violations of international 
law, failed to provide them with the full set of procedural 
protections provided by that same body of law.  The vast majority 
of defendants in both iterations of commissions were charged with 
murder in violation of the laws of war, conspiracy, and material 
support for terrorism, all dubious as criminal violations of 
international law.211  Relaxed admissions standards for coerced 
evidence212 and reduced confrontation rights213 similarly departed 
 
211 See supra notes 159–162 & accompanying text (detailing inconsistencies 
between IHL and the definitions of crimes used in the MCA). 
212 The Torture Convention bars the admission of evidence obtained through 
torture in any legal proceeding.  Convention Against Torture art. 15, Dec. 10, 1984, 
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is 
established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as 
evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as 
evidence that the statement was made.”).  The Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) 
has interpreted Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”) as prohibiting admission of any evidence obtained “through 
torture or other prohibited treatment,” which would include cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment.  Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, General 
Comment No. 20, CCPR 20, ¶ 12 (Oct. 3, 1992).  The United States does not believe 
that the HRC has the right to issue binding interpretations of the ICCPR, and has 
in other contexts questioned the legitimacy of the broad scope of the HRC’s 
interpretation of Article 7.  See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comments by the 
Government of the United States of America on the Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1/Add.1 1P 16 
(Feb. 2, 2008) (rejecting Comment 20’s interpretation of Article 7 as including a 
non-refoulement obligation). 
213 Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, which is thought to provide the 
customary international law minimum requirements for procedural protections 
for defendants in war crimes prosecutions, guarantees defendants “the right to 
examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him.”  Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3.  The United States during the Bush Administration was unclear on 
whether it accepted Article 75 as customary international law.  Compare Julian E. 
Barnes, Internal Critics Seek a Softer Line; Bush Administration Moderates Push to 
Change Detention and Interrogation Policies Before Their Time’s Up, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
12, 2008, at A20 (quoting Sandra D. Hodginkson, then Defense Department 
Assistant Secretary for Detainee Affairs, describing lack of agreement within Bush 
Administration on Article 75’s status as custom), with William H. Taft IV, The Law 
of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 321–22 
(2003) (noting the general objections of the United States to Protocol 1 but 
concluding that the United States considers Article 75 customary international 
law). 
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from minimum protections traditionally provided defendants in 
international law.  Not only is it counterintuitive to believe that 
trials skewed to aid the prosecution will convince a skeptical 
public of anything other than the might of the entity conducting 
the trial, but also, unfair procedures undermine the respect for the 
rule of law that is an essential component of norm projection.214 
Military commissions also acted inconsistently by only 
prosecuting the war crimes committed by members of al Qaeda 
and affiliated groups.  There is strong evidence that the United 
States committed war crimes in the course of the conflict with al 
Qaeda,215 sometimes against the very defendants who were being 
prosecuted.216  Despite this evidence, Americans responsible for 
these crimes were not investigated or prosecuted during the Bush 
 
214 See DOUGLAS, supra note 6, at 3 (“[T]he notion that a trial can succeed as 
pedagogy yet fail to do justice is crucially flawed.”); Drumbl, supra note 5, at 1188 
(explaining that too little due process in trials will increase perception of victor’s 
justice and that the value of law will increase if the process is considered 
legitimate). 
215 Former Bush Administration officials have recently come forward with 
admissions that detainees in the war on terrorism have been tortured.  Susan 
Crawford, Convening Authority to the Military Commissions, stated that the 
reason she dropped charges against Mohammed al-Qahtani for his involvement 
in the 9/11 attacks was because the Defense Department tortured him.  
Woodward, supra note 182.  More recently, President Obama stated his belief that 
some interrogation techniques, in particular waterboarding, constituted torture.  
President Barack Obama, News Conference by the President (Apr. 29, 2009), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/News-Conference-by             
-the-President-4/29/2009 (“I believe that waterboarding was torture.  And I think 
that the — whatever legal rationales were used, it was a mistake.”). 
216 Nearly every prosecution of a detainee included allegations of 
mistreatment. See Raymond Bonner, Detainee Says He Was Abused While in U.S. 
Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007, at A10 (describing allegations from David 
Hicks, the first detainee to be formally charged under new tribunal rules, that he 
was thrown around, walked on, injected with strange substances, and rectally 
probed by U.S. forces prior to arriving at Guantanamo); William Glaberson, U.S. 
Drops War Crimes Charges for 5 Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, at 
A1 (stating Binyam Mohamed claims he was tortured while in American custody 
or in countries where he was sent by the United States); William Glaberson, 
Detainee’s Lawyers Make Claim on Sleep Deprivation, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2008, at A15 
(describing Operation Sandman in which Hamdan was subjected to intense sleep 
deprivation for 50 days); William Glaberson, Arraigned, 9/11 Defendants Talk of 
Martyrdom, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2008, at A1 (recording Khalid Shaikh Mohamed’s 
allegation of “torturing”); William Glaberson, A Legal Filing Alleges a Detainee was 
Abused, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2008, at A11 (describing Hamdan’s allegation of being 
beaten and sexually humiliated during interrogations); Woodward, supra note 182 
(describing alleged-9/11 terrorist Mohamed al-Qahtani’s  subjection to prolonged 
isolation, forced nudity, sexual humiliation, and trained dogs). 
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Administration.217  Given the widespread knowledge in the Islamic 
world of the evidence of these American transgressions,218 the 
failure to address them greatly undermined any effort to portray 
military commissions as an attempt to vindicate international 
norms. 
Will the Obama plan to bifurcate trials between the U.S. federal 
courts and revamped military commissions fare any better on the 
consistency front?  As discussed, MCA09 was designed to address 
the most glaring procedural problems associated with the Bush-era 
commissions.  MCA09 moves closer to international standards by 
absolutely barring evidence obtained through illegal means, and 
by adjusting discovery, classified information and hearsay rules to 
approximate those used in the federal courts.219  However, it 
appears that future military commissions may still significantly 
depart from the protections provided to defendants in 
international trials.  Material support for terrorism, conspiracy as a 
stand alone offense, and murder in violation of the laws of war all 
remain as potential offenses for use by the prosecutor.  As for the 
use of classified information, while the MCA09 does push for 
greater evidentiary transparency,220 a major purpose for using 
military commissions remains the protection of intelligence sources 
and the admission of evidence not otherwise admissible in a 
federal court.  It is unclear whether those goals can be met in trials 
that still provide defendants with the opportunity to confront all 
the evidence against them. 
Nevertheless, the very premise of a bifurcated approach has 
built-in consistency problems.  While the MCA09 increased 
procedural protections for the defendants, it still provides less in 
 
217 While the Bush Administration refused to appoint a special prosecutor to 
investigate its treatment of detainees, there have been some internal investigations 
within the military and government agencies.  Almost all of the targets of these 
investigations have been cleared.  David Johnston, Rights Group Cites Rumsfeld 
And Tenet in Report on Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2005, at A14. 
218 A 2006 survey found that 80% of Egyptians, 79% of Jordanians, and 68% 
of Turks had heard of U.S. abuse of Muslim detainees, either at Guantanamo or 
Abu Ghraib. THE PEW GLOBAL PROJECT ATTITUDES, NO GLOBAL WARMING ALARM IN 
THE U.S. AND CHINA: AMERICA’S IMAGE SLIPS, BUT ALLIES SHARE U.S. CONCERNS 
OVER IRAN, HAMAS 21 (2006).  Interestingly, only 21% of Pakistanis reported 
knowing about either Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo detainee abuse.  Id. 
219 See supra notes 187–90 (describing procedural changes to commissions). 
220 See MCA09 §949p-1(c) (requiring that evidence used at trial “is 
declassified to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the requirements of 
national security”). 
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the way of process than the federal courts, and purposely so. 221  
The image of one set of defendants receiving greater procedural 
protections, while other sets receive less, is exactly the sort of 
inconsistency that risks the legitimacy of the trial process.222  The 
Obama Administration could attempt to reduce this inconsistency 
through articulation of a neutral principle that explains how it 
selects detainees for a trial forum.  Indeed, Attorney General 
Holder suggested the reason the accused Cole bomber was treated 
differently from the 9/11 plotters was that the Cole was a military 
target outside the United States, as opposed to a civilian domestic 
target.  But it will be difficult for such explanations to break 
through the perception that commissions are selected where the 
government believes its evidence is insufficient to withstand the 
rigors of federal court.223  Moreover, those being tried in federal 
courts will not be tried for violations of international law, but 
rather for violations of U.S. domestic law.  While such an approach 
is consistent with the law of war,224 not using international law 
sacrifices the legitimacy potentially associated with international 
norms.  Although the same substantive conduct will be at issue 
regardless of applicable law, trials conducted using U.S. law may 
be more easily dismissed as victor’s justice. 
Even if future trials do provide procedural protections to the 
defendant that adhere to international law, future trials in any 
venue must wrestle with the problem of consistently dealing with 
violations committed by all parties to the conflict.  The United 
States has admittedly violated the jus cogens prohibition on torture 
 
221 See Obama Address, supra note 1 (describing the advantages of using 
military commissions as providing for the “protection of sensitive sources and 
methods of intelligence-gathering” and “allow[ing] for the safety and security of 
participants; and for the presentation of evidence gathered from the battlefield 
that cannot always be effectively presented in federal courts”). 
222 See Morris Davis, Op-Ed., Justice and Guantanamo Bay, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 
2009, at A21 (stating that the “legal double standard” of Obama approach will 
“only perpetuate the perception that Guantanamo and justice are mutually 
exclusive”). 
223 See Jack Goldsmith & James Comey, Op-Ed., Holder’s Reasonable Decision, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2009, at A23 (dismissing Holder’s contention, and arguing 
instead that the decision to send the Cole bomber to a commission was motivated 
by a “relatively weak” case). 
224 See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETATIVE 
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 84 (2009) (explaining that because non-state actors 
who take up arms lack combatant immunity they may be prosecuted under 
municipal law). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
 
480 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:2 
in its conflict with al Qaeda.  It has also failed to prosecute those 
who committed torture, or to compensate torture victims—two 
further violations of international law.225  No set of trials will 
successfully internalize an anti-terrorism norm in the Islamic world 
so long as those trials are seen to solely target the crimes of 
Muslims, while crimes committed against Muslims go unpunished.  
Nevertheless, it is difficult to envision any authority trying those 
involved in war crimes committed by the United States.  The 
Obama Administration has ruled out prosecuting CIA officers for 
their involvement in detainee abuse.226  It also does not appear to 
favor investigation or prosecution of high-ranking Bush 
Administration officials who authorized abuse.227 
If the Obama approach seems doomed with respect to 
consistency, what about potential alternative trial forums?  
Municipal courts in the Islamic world are notorious for failing to 
provide defendants with fair trials and other critical protections 
guaranteed under international law.228  These problems create real 
restrictions on the ability of the United States to transfer detainees 
from Guantanamo to their home countries for trial.229  More 
fundamentally, norm internalization cannot depend on legal 
 
225 See Convention Against Torture, supra note 212, art. 7(1) (mandating that, 
absent extradition, cases of those engaged in torture be submitted to competent 
authorities for prosecution); id. art. 14(1) (“Each State Party shall ensure in its legal 
system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable 
right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full 
rehabilitation as possible.”).  The Military Commissions Act deprives those 
detained at Guantanamo who were properly determined to be enemy combatants 
(or who are awaiting such determination) from seeking damages for their 
treatment at Guantanamo.  28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (2006). 
226 See Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Memos Spell Out Brutal C.I.A. Mode of 
Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at A1 (reporting President Obama’s 
decision not to prosecute the officers). 
227 See David Johnston & Scott Shane, Torture Memos: Inquiry Suggests No 
Prosecutions, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2009, at A1 (reporting that an internal Justice 
Department inquiry concluded not to prosecute Bush Administration lawyers for 
their role in authorizing torture). 
228 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: EGYPT (2008) (stating 
that in practice the Egyptian judiciary is “subject to executive influence and 
corruption”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: SAUDI ARABIA (2008)  
(describing court system with closed trials, no presumption of innocence, and de 
jure discrimination on the basis of gender and religion); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: PAKISTAN (2008) (describing courts as “corrupt, inefficient, 
and subject to pressure from prominent wealthy, religious, and political figures”). 
229 See Ashley S. Deeks, Avoiding Transfers to Torture 6–7 (Council on Foreign 
Relations, CSR No. 35, 2008) (describing international legal restrictions on the 
ability to transfer persons to a country where there is a risk of mistreatment). 
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systems that do not meet international standards to serve as the 
primary internalization mechanism, if for no other reason than that 
procedural failing would erode the confidence of locals in their 
courts.230  Moreover, it is unclear that municipal courts in 
particular Islamic states would even be recognized as “local” 
courts by their respective populations.  Municipal courts of states 
friendly to the United States may be viewed as “stooges” of the 
United States, as opposed to an entity genuinely prosecuting 
offenses against the community.  In fractured states, like Iraq, 
municipal courts may also be viewed as victor’s justice imposed by 
one subgroup on another, limiting the potential norm 
internalization impact of proceedings in those courts.231 
Providing due process protections that meet minimal 
international standards may also be difficult for an international 
court that incorporates Sharia principles.  The European Court of 
Human Rights has questioned the compatibility of Sharia rules of 
evidence, criminal procedure, and punishment, including the 
death penalty, with human rights law.232  Incorporation of Shariah 
law into an international tribunal may be the political death knell 
for such a tribunal.233  On the other hand, the compromises that 
would be required to render Sharia law consistent with human 
rights law may, paradoxically, deprive Sharia of the legitimacy 
with Islamic audiences necessary for successful norm 
internalization, who may discount findings from a legal institution 
that does not fully comply with Islamic law. 
 
230 See, e.g., Michael Slackman, Tycoon Gets Death in Singer’s Murder, Stunning 
an Egypt Leery of its Courts, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2009, at A4 (quoting Egyptian 
political observers on the general distrust of the local population of the Egyptian 
government and its courts). 
231 Supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
232 See Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 39–40 (2003) (describing 
Sharia law as inconsistent with democracy in part because of its rules regarding 
criminal law and criminal procedure).  See also Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with 
Bin Laden and al Qaeda Terrorists?: A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and 
United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 591, 605 (2001) (rejecting inclusion of Sharia in international trials of 
terrorists because of its incompatibility with Western legal tradition). 
233 For example, France and the United Kingdom would likely veto creation 
of a tribunal through the Security Council that included the death penalty as a 
potential sentence—a sentence that would be expected from a tribunal consistent 
with the Sharia.  See Ohlin, supra note 72, at 748 (explaining that France and the 
United Kingdom prevented the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda from 
including the death penalty in its punishment scheme). 
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If the Obama Administration is opposed to U.S. courts 
investigating detainee abuse, it is fair to assume it would oppose 
any international effort to do the same.234 
4.3.2.  Selectivity and Accessibility 
Selectivity demands that war crimes prosecutions focus on the 
most important war criminals, charges and punishments.  Norm 
internalization depends upon the spectacle of trial dramatizing the 
effect of wrongdoing and the stigma associated with wrongdoers.  
Only the most important narratives will create a spectacle 
sufficiently dramatic to pierce the consciousness of the target 
audience in the manner necessary for norm internalization.  
Accessibility builds upon selectivity by requiring that the public 
have access to the narrative developed through the trial.  The most 
spectacular trial will contribute to norm internalization only if the 
public can learn about what occurred.  Therefore, accessibility 
requires that prosecutors make decisions about evidence with the 
goal of creating a dramatic case to present to the public.  Because 
the media is the primary outlet through which the public learns 
about trials, accessibility also demands a strategy to overcome 
media biases that will otherwise distort trial coverage. 
The Bush Administration’s military commissions failed both 
the selectivity and accessibility tests.  As to the former, potential 
key defendants, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-
Zawahiri, were not available for prosecution because they could 
not be captured.  While Guantanamo did house other potential 
defendants of importance, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the 
strategy to front-load prosecutions of low-level al Qaeda and 
Taliban members to test the system resulted in completed 
prosecutions of only minor figures.  Unimportant defendants led to 
 
234 It is possible that the United States’ unwillingness to seriously investigate 
war crimes committed by its officials would confer jurisdiction on the ICC to 
consider such crimes at the prosecutor’s behest, provided they occurred within 
the territory of a state party to the Rome Statute.  See Rome Statute, supra note 46, 
arts. 12–17 (conferring jurisdiction over actions taking place in territory of a State 
Party to the agreement on the ICC).  Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine the ICC 
burdening its burgeoning relationship with the United States in this way.  See 
Agence France-Presse, Under Obama U.S. Drops Hostility to ICC: Experts, TRUTHOUT 
(Mar. 22, 2009), available at http://www.truthout.org/032309S (describing 
gradually improving relations between the United States and the International 
Criminal Court under the Obama administration). 
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relatively unimportant charges235 and relatively short sentences 
after conviction.236  These banal narratives created by the military 
commissions were unlikely to influence norms in the Islamic 
world. 
Commissions also failed to be accessible.  Military commissions 
valued secrecy above all else, undermining their didactic impact.237  
The initial iteration of commissions even permitted proceedings to 
be closed from even to the defendant and his civilian lawyer under 
certain circumstances.238  While the Military Commissions Act 
guaranteed the defendant’s right to be present at trial, it still 
allowed the judge to close the proceedings from the public to 
protect national security.239  The military judge in the Hamdan trial 
frequently employed this rule, as significant portions of the trial, 
including most of the defense case, were closed from public 
view.240  The amount of classified evidence not available to the 
public was expected to increase in cases involving detainees who 
had been part of the CIA interrogation program.241  While 
 
235 Pre-Hamdan military commissions accused most of the ten detainees 
charged only with conspiracy based on their involvement with al Qaeda and the 
Taliban.  David Hicks and Omar Khadr were also charged with murder 
(attempted murder in Hicks’ case) and aiding the enemy based on involvement in 
firefights between the Taliban and the U.S. military during the war in 
Afghanistan.  Only Abdul Zahir was charged with directly attacking civilians.  
U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Military Commissions, http://www.defenselink.mil/news 
/Nov2004/charge_sheets.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2009).  Post-Hamdan 
commissions did charge defendants with much more serious crimes, but with the 
exception of the Bahlul case, the only charges that proceeded to trial were for 
relatively minor offenses of material support for terrorism and conspiracy.  Id. 
236 Hicks and Hamdan received less than a year of additional prison time 
based on their convictions.  See supra text accompanying notes 162–163 (reporting 
sentences of only five and nine months for two Guantanamo convicts).  Bahlul 
was the exception, as he received a life sentence after refusing to offer a defense at 
trial in protest over the legitimacy of commissions.  Supra note 166. 
237 See Drumbl, supra note 5, at 1196 (arguing that “secretiveness” would 
minimize the educational impact of MCA commissions). 
238 MCO 1, supra note 148, at § 6(b)(3). 
239 MCA, § 949d(d)(2)(A). 
240 See William Glaberson, A Conviction, but a System Still on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 10, 2008, at A27 (describing problems in Hamden’s trial stemming from 
“secret filings,” “closed sessions,” and the inability of anyone to attend 
proceedings without military orders). 
241 See Josh White, Detainees May Be Denied Evidence for Defense, WASH. POST, 
June 15, 2008, at A3.  But see Dan Ephron, “Fair, Open, Just, Honest”, NEWSWEEK, 
June 2, 2008, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/139664/output/print 
(quoting the military commission’s legal adviser Brig. Gen. Thomas Hartmann as 
stating that “relatively little” of the trials would be closed to reporters). 
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preserving the secrecy of classified information is understandable, 
insofar as it is necessary to protect sources and methods in the war 
on terrorism, conducting trials largely hidden from the public 
prevents the trials from having any didactic impact and raises 
suspicions about the process that may actively undermine the 
trial’s legitimacy among Muslims. 
This secrecy augmented the problems the commissions faced in 
using the media to spread the expressive content of trials.  The 
procedures of military commissions were not familiar to reporters 
in a way that procedures in the U.S. federal courts or courts-martial 
would be, resulting in ignorance about the process that impeded 
coverage.242  American reporters were puzzled by trials featuring 
secret evidence, secret witnesses, an empty court gallery, and other 
tight restrictions on the access of reporters to trials.243  The press in 
the Islamic world largely relied on reports produced by newswires 
and American newspapers for their coverage of the trials at 
Guantanamo, generally choosing not to send reporters to the 
trials.244  Both U.S. and international media also displayed the 
traditional bias that favors reporting on the antics of the defendant, 
rather than on the prosecution’s case.245  Allegations of torture by 
defendants continuously dominated press coverage of the cases, as 
defendants sought to use treatment issues as part of a public 
 
242 See Drumbl, supra note 5, at 1196 (arguing that the “opacity” of the 
commissions’ process reduced their narrative impact). 
243 See Glaberson, supra note 240 (describing “mysteries” that marked 
differences between commissions and normal American trials).  Of course, trials 
in U.S. federal courts can use classified evidence not available to the public 
consistent with the Classified Information Procedures Act.  See 18 U.S.C. App. III, 
§ 1–16 (regulating use of protective orders to prevent disclosure of classified 
information). 
244 E-mail from Tara A. Jones, Office of Detainee Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 
Defense, to author (Mar. 16, 2009) (on file with author) (noting that the only 
Islamic world media that attended military commissions were the Saudi Press 
Agency, Al Jazeera English and Arabic, al Arabiya, and al Hurrah). 
245 Ironically, in some instances the media’s desire to cover the statements of 
the defendants may have actually helped norm internalization.  Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, on trial for involvement in the 9/11 attacks, and four other men filed 
a document with the military commission to proudly claim responsibility for the 
attacks as a “model of Islamic action,” and a “badge of honor.”  William 
Glaberson, Detainees Say They Planned Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, at A17.  
These sorts of declarations confirm the responsibility of Islamic radicals for the 
terror of 9/11, potentially opening the door to a shared factual understanding of 
that day’s events. 
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relations strategy against the commissions.246  Furthermore, the 
failure of commissions to employ victim testimony that would 
compete for attention with the torture narrative aided this 
strategy.247 
Will Obama’s bifurcated approach resolve these problems? It 
does appear that the Administration is committed to greater 
selectivity in its prosecution decisions.  Priority has been given to 
prosecution of top al Qaeda members in custody for involvement 
in important crimes like the 9/11 attacks, the attacks on the African 
embassies, and the attack on the USS Cole.  With these important 
suspects and alleged crimes comes the potential of serious 
sentences, as the Administration has indicated its intent to seek the 
death penalty in certain cases.248  Such trials should involve 
charges and potential sentences of a sufficient force to pierce the 
consciousness of the Islamic world to the degree necessary for 
norm internalization. 
Accessibility may also be improved under the Obama plan.  
For those being tried in military commissions, MCA09 requires 
that evidence used at trial is “declassified to the maximum extent 
possible, consistent with the requirements of national security.”249  
This provision may work to reverse the presumption of secrecy 
that permeated the Bush-era commissions.  For those being 
prosecuted in the federal courts, there should be greater media 
coverage than in commissions.  There is an established pool of 
reporters covering federal trials, and their coverage should reflect 
 
246 See William Glaberson, Detainees’ Mental Health is Latest Legal Battle, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2008, at A1 (quoting defense counsel Clive Stafford Smith stating 
“[t]he issue of mistreatment of prisoners . . . will come up in every case”). 
247 The impact of statements by victim’s families was on display during a rare 
hearing where they were allowed to attend.  Their presence offered a powerful 
rebuttal to critics of commissions.  See William Glaberson, Relatives of 9/11 Victims 
Add a Passionate Layer to Guantanamo Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008, at A28 
(describing the unsettling effect presence of victims’ families had on critics of 
commissions). 
248 See Eric Lichtblau & Benjamin Weiser, 9/11 Trial Poses Unparalleled Legal 
Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A14 (quoting Attorney General Holder 
regarding his intent to seek the death penalty against Khalid Shaikh Mohammed).  
This differs from the decision of the Attorney General with respect to Ahmed 
Ghailani, who is on trial in federal court for his involvement in the African 
Embassy bombings.  Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Won’t Seek Death for ex-Guantanamo 
Detainee, available at http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/us-wont       
-seek-death-for-ex-guantanamo-detainee/?scp=2&sq=holder%20death%20penalty 
%20ghailani&st=cse (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
249 See MCA09 §949p-1(c). 
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greater understanding of the trial procedures.250  Islamic world 
press must have greater access to trials not taking place on a 
restricted military base, increasing their ability to cover the trials. 
Still, these trials appear destined to involve large amounts of 
classified information.251  The need to protect intelligence sources 
and methods will result in parts of trials being closed to the public, 
or otherwise restricted, to prevent the disclosure of classified 
information.252  While this may make sense from the perspective of 
national security, from the perspective of norm internalization 
there is nothing worse than a closed trial.  It is impossible for trials 
to have didactic impact when the evidence that creates the 
historical record is shielded from public view.  This clash between 
selectivity and accessibility is highlighted by a dispute that 
hindered the Bush Administration’s commissions.  Former chief 
prosecutor Morris Davis and Convening Authority Legal Adviser  
Brig. Gen. Tom Hartmann had a much-publicized dispute over the 
commissions’ selective strategy.253  Davis argued that for trials to 
be meaningful they needed to be transparent, and therefore 
pushed for prosecutions of small fish who could be tried using 
unclassified material.  Hartmann countered with a strategy that 
called for trying high-ranking al Qaeda members in order to 
demonstrate to the public that the detentions at Guantanamo were 
worthwhile.  Of course, such an approach would result in partially 
closed trials and large amounts of classified information.  From the 
perspective of norm internalization, both the Davis and Hartmann 
approaches fail.  While the trials Davis advocated for would be 
more transparent, their didactic impact would be lost through 
projection of unimportant narratives.  While Hartmann’s approach 
is more selective, the educative force of the trials of high value 
detainees would be lost in secrecy.  It may be that the Obama 
Administration has adopted the Hartmann approach with its 
attendant limitations. 
 
250 But see Slotnick, supra note 74, at 22 (discussing ways in which American 
media coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court is oversimplified). 
251 See Jack Goldsmith, Long-Term Terrorist Detention and our National Security 
Court 4 (Brookings Institution, Working Paper, 2009) (explaining that prosecutions 
of high ranking al Qaeda figures will require the use of information derived from 
overseas intelligence sources). 
252 Id.  
253 For a thorough description of this dispute and the facts described here, see 
Jess Bravin, Dispute Stymies Guantanamo Terror Trials, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2007, at 
A4. 
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The problem posed by classified information is just one 
accessibility problem faced with any forthcoming set of trials.  
Accessibility requires navigating the difficult terrain of media bias, 
and here that involves confronting at least two major problems.  
First, the torture allegations that plagued military commissions 
will continue regardless of where the detainee is prosecuted.  
Ahmed Ghailani—a former Guantanamo detainee who is now 
being prosecuted in U.S. federal court for his involvement in the 
African Embassy bombings—has asked for information about his 
mistreatment in the CIA interrogation program to be introduced 
into trial.254  Such allegations, especially where unaddressed 
through separate investigation and prosecution, will continuously 
disrupt the narrative produced at trial.  Second, the Islamic world’s 
local media has been surprisingly uninterested in terrorism trials, 
except in reporting torture allegations.  This bias, based as much on 
sensationalism as anti-Americanism, may be difficult to counter in 
any trial venue absent equally spectacular factual development of 
the wrongs committed by members of al Qaeda.  Such a counter-
narrative will be difficult to develop publicly when based on 
classified information. 
Still, the Obama approach may be the best available with 
respect to selectivity and accessibility.  The general opposition of 
the United States to allowing use of its classified information in 
foreign or international trials suggests that trials of top al Qaeda 
figures from Guantanamo in any non-American tribunal is highly 
unlikely, at least using information provided by the United 
States.255  Even if an international tribunal were to gain custody of 
a current detainee, the problems the ICTY and ICTR have faced in 
making their narratives accessible to target audiences suggest that 
accessibility issues remain.  An international tribunal mixing in 
Sharia concepts with existing international law seems sure to be as 
baffling to reporters as the Bush-era commissions, if not more. 
 
254 See Benjamin Weiser, Secret CIA Jails an Issue in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 2, 2009, at A20 (describing request by Ghailani defense counsel to visit CIA 
“black sites” to seek exculpatory evidence). 
255 See American Service-Members’ Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7425 (2002) for 
the prohibition on transferring classified information to the ICC.  See also supra 
note 132 (describing unwillingness of U.S. to provide evidence to a German 
tribunal, resulting in acquittal of al Qaeda suspect). 
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4.3.3. Integration 
Integration requires that trials for violations of international 
law be just one piece of a larger effort to inculcate the norm in 
question.  Other institutions in society must strengthen and 
magnify the narratives produced at trial through techniques 
including generating and disseminating information; identifying 
and leveraging power sources that can affect the needed change; 
and leading efforts to hold those powerful actors accountable for 
their commitment to the norm in question.  While it is unlikely that 
institutions in the target audience are already supportive of the 
norms in question, war crimes trials achieve the greatest 
integration when they support developing efforts within societies 
to inculcate greater respect for international law. 
Military commissions were not integrated into any larger norm 
development effort within the Islamic world.  There is no evidence 
to suggest that commissions attempted to recruit key Islamic 
religious, educational, or media figures in supporting the 
commissions’ message.  This is not surprising since norm 
internalization was not a primary objective of commissions.  
Integration, perhaps more than the other conditions, requires an 
affirmative effort outside the traditional prosecutorial process. 
The Obama approach seems no better situated to integrate trial 
efforts with local institutions in the Islamic world.  As a general 
matter, prosecution and court officials in the United States have 
not viewed social outreach as a part of the judicial function.256  
Given the difficulties high-profile defendants like Khalid Shaikh 
Mohammed may face in securing a free trial in the United States, 
prosecutors may be particularly wary of any public diplomacy 
effort regarding the trials.257  Even if interested, U.S. officials 
probably lack the knowledge of social conditions in the Islamic 
world necessary for effective integration.258  The ICTY, concerned 
 
256 See supra text accompanying note 114 (noting tension between a trial’s 
public accessibility, protected by the First Amendment, and a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment Right to a fair trial). 
257 See Lichtblau & Weiser, supra note 248 (noting that defense is sure to 
challenge whether KSM can have a fair trial in close proximity to the World Trade 
Center site). 
258 The U.S. military appears to have learned this lesson.  Captain Brian 
Huysman explains the reason the United States needs more Afghan troops to 
communicate with locals: “We can’t read these people; we’re different.”  Richard 
A. Oppel, Jr., Allied Officers Concerned by Lack of Afghan Forces, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 
2009, at A8. 
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about the gulf separating itself from the people of the former 
Yugoslavia, began the Outreach Program in 1999.  That program 
sought to provide information about the ICTY and to initiate a 
dialogue with the people “to engage existing local legal 
communities, non-governmental organizations, victims’ 
associations and educational institutions.”259  The Outreach 
Program is not viewed as particularly successful, however, at least 
partly because of the ICTY staff’s lack of familiarity with 
conditions in the former Yugoslavia.260  Similar limitations seem 
likely to plague any U.S. integration efforts. 
Of course, local trials in the municipal courts of Islamic states 
would be most effective at integration, as municipal courts would 
best positioned to identify the opinion leaders who may be most 
influential in assisting norm internalization efforts.  As discussed 
above, however, the municipal courts of the Islamic world appear 
ill suited to conduct trials for violations of international law, given 
their generally decrepit condition.  The international community 
could consider large-scale assistance to these institutions.261  Such 
an effort is not without precedent.  The United States has invested 
heavily in developing the Central Criminal Court in Iraq (“CCCI”) 
and the Afghan National Detention Center (“ANDC”) in 
Afghanistan to prosecute and detain locals involved in terrorist 
activity.  But major concerns about the fairness of trials provided 
by these institutions persist.262  Moreover, providing assistance to 
improve the municipal courts of Islamic states is a long-term plan 
that will run far beyond the time allocated to deal with the 
remaining cases at Guantanamo.263 
Assuming local trials are unlikely to be available for the 
majority of cases, an international court employing Islamic jurists 
and Shariah concepts may be the best suited to integrate with and 
 
259 Hum. Rts. Center, supra note 77, at 110–111. 
260 See id. at 140 (detailing local legal professionals’ lack of information about 
ICTY despite Outreach Program). 
261 See Alvarez, supra note 72, at 461 (arguing that the international 
community should make an effort to improve local courts in the first instance). 
262 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE: FAILINGS OF IRAQ’S 
CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT  (2008) (detailing serious due process and fair trial 
violations in the CCCI despite the role of the United States in assisting the court); 
Tim Golden, Defying U.S. Plan, Prison Expands in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 
2008, at A1 (describing the difficulties associated with the ANDC). 
263 See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (ordering closure of 
Guantanamo within one year on January 22, 2009). 
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promote local norm internalization efforts.  Islamic jurists will have 
the best available knowledge of institutions within the Islamic 
world, and may be best positioned to target appropriate opinion 
leaders to create working synergies. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This Article developed four conditions for norm-internalization 
success that trials for international law violations must possess to 
avoid the pitfalls that have prevented norm internalization within 
the defendant’s community in the past:  consistency, selectivity, 
accessibility, and integration.  Application of these four conditions 
to the trials of detainees at Guantanamo Bay reveals three reasons 
such trials are unlikely to contribute to internalization of an anti-
terrorism norm in the Islamic world.  First, the mistreatment of 
detainees by the Bush Administration robs future trials of their full 
normative impact.  The failure to prosecute Bush Administration 
officials involved in violations of international law displays an 
inconsistent application of the law that will allow the Islamic world 
to dismiss the trials as “victor’s justice.”  Allegations of torture will 
also plague trials of these detainees, distorting the narrative 
emerging from the trial and reducing its normative impact.  
Second, the need to use classified information to convict those 
involved in the most serious terrorist acts creates a troubling 
paradox regarding norm internalization.  Selectively prosecuting 
the most serious offenders is a requisite of successful norm 
internalization, but it is precisely those trials that will use the most 
classified information, thereby undermining the goal of 
accessibility.  The alternative of prosecuting only those lower level 
offenders who can be tried with unclassified information also fails 
the four-conditions test; the marginal narratives such an approach 
creates are unlikely to pierce the consciousness of the Islamic 
world.  Third, integrating the Guantanamo trials with local norm 
internalization efforts is difficult.  Municipal courts—those best 
situated to create synergies with local institutions—are decrepit in 
most Islamic states, making them poor venues for trials 
international law violations.  Non-Islamic tribunals, which may be 
more procedurally sound, are unlikely to be able to identify the 
appropriate local actors who can augment the trial message.264  
 
264 International tribunals employing Sharia law may be best positioned to 
integrate their message with other institutions in the Islamic world, provided 
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This analysis is important because policy makers confront difficult 
trade-offs in deciding which trial objectives should be favored in 
determining trial venue and strategy.  Given that norm 
internalization is unlikely to succeed in this context, policy makers 
may be more successful in focusing on alternative objectives. 
Moving beyond the Guantanamo context, this analysis also 
sheds light on the important debate surrounding whether it is 
reasonable to believe that trials can contribute to norm 
internalization.265  The absence of a clear norm internalization 
success story creates a natural skepticism about the ability of trials 
to aid in norm internalization in the defendant’s community.  The 
conclusion that trials of Guantanamo detainees are unlikely to 
achieve norm internalization in the Islamic world deepens that 
skepticism.  This is not to say that Guantanamo is an ideal test case.  
American abuses and missteps at Guantanamo make it difficult to 
project the conclusions developed there onto other contexts.  But 
no trial authority prosecuting detainees for events emerging from 
an armed conflict or massive human rights tragedy will be ideally 
situated to internalize norms in the community of the defendant.  
Resentments and deep suspicion within the community of the 
defendant exist even where the circumstances of capture and 
detention are not as provocative as in Guantanamo Bay.  Indeed, 
even when presented with evidence of in-community misdeeds, 
the reaction may be more to reject the reality of the evidence, than 
to accept its consequences.266 
The nature of the four factors raises real questions regarding 
whether these problems may be overcome to allow norm 
internalization to succeed.  Consistency will almost always run into 
alternative penological goals. 
  As important as following international legal procedures is to 
norm internalization, providing defendants the full panoply of 
protections can run against the interest in incapacitating and 
punishing the defendant, concerns that have been preeminent in 
trials to date.  Similarly, while the trial authority may wish to 
 
other concerns about such tribunals were addressed.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 232–33 (detailing problems with international tribunals). 
265 Compare Damaska, supra note 6, at 346 (dismissing critics who are 
skeptical of the didactic power of trials), with Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 26, 
at 39–41 (questioning the power of international trials to trigger norm cascades). 
266 See Sontag, supra note 29, at 11 (describing groups in Spain and the former 
Yugoslavia that refused to accept the reality of war crimes, choosing instead to 
ascribe the atrocities to their enemies or dismiss them as propaganda). 
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conduct investigations and trials that encompass the crimes of all 
involved in a conflict, the reality is that political considerations 
trump this concern.  Indeed, the demand of consistency becomes 
overwhelming if the concept to include the historical contexts 
behind current atrocities, as criminal tribunals would struggle in 
holding persons criminally liable for long-since passed events. 
The paradoxical relationship between selectivity and 
accessibility also seem likely to stymie norm internalization events.  
So long as the prosecutions of the most important figures in human 
rights and law of war atrocities involve large amounts of classified 
information, conducting open trials where the public can learn 
from the evidence presented is difficult.  This problem is 
compounded where the charges against these defendants are so 
complicated that the trial becomes so long as to be essentially 
unwatchable.  Resolving this problem through prosecution of 
simpler cases, involving publicly available evidence is usually an 
inadequate answer, as such cases tend to be insufficiently 
spectacular to capture the public imagination as is required for 
norm internalization. 
Finally, integration presents its own irony.  The appeal of norm 
internalization as a trial goal stems from the unique influence that 
international law has over the conduct of trials for its violation.  In 
societies where international law has little or no other influence 
over institutions that contribute to norm development, the appeal 
of this trial objective grows.  Yet, it is precisely this condition that 
makes norm internalization unlikely to succeed without the 
message reinforcement efforts that only key actors and social 
institutions can provide. 
These problems suggest that trials may be ill suited to 
achieving norm internalization.  Trials may be better oriented 
around alternative aims, like retribution or incapacitation; 
alternative institutions in society may be better entrusted with 
informational, political and social tasks necessary for norm 
internalization. 
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